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The copyright market for creative works such as music 
and movies traditionally involves a complex web of licensing 
transactions and exorbitant transaction costs. Out of every 
dollar that consumers pay, an artist who writes, performs, 
and produces her own work may receive less than fifteen 
cents while the rest are diverted to cover the costs of 
financing new production, marketing new works, and 
distributing royalties. Although artists are typically 
scheduled to receive royalties on a quarterly basis, a 
payment may lag as far as two years after users paid. 
Furthermore, if a collecting society is unable to identify the 
rightful owner for a royalty payment, it routinely allocates 
the royalty among its existing members. 
This Article proposes a blockchain copyright exchange 
(“BCE”) that dramatically improves efficiency and accuracy 
 
†Fellow, Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School. This article is 
awarded the Top Prize in the International Machine Lawyering Conference 2021. 
I am grateful to Paul Goldstein, Joseph A. Grundfest, Roland Vogl, Joshua P. 
Davis, David C Donald, Jyh-An Lee, Kevin Guo, Charles Cheng, Lincoln Deng, 
Leon Xiu, Yu Di, Jing Li, Aily Meng and Zuocheng Hao for insightful comments. 
Of course, all errors remain my own. ©2021 Jiarui Liu. 
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in copyright transactions by hardcoding thousands of 
copyright rules and license terms in blockchain-based smart 
contracts. First, BCE allows artists to earn a royalty per 
stream potentially sixteen times larger than Spotify offers 
and eighty times larger than YouTube offers. Artists receive 
payments at a speed millions of times faster, in a matter of 
seconds instead of months, with zero administrative charges 
and zero dollars falling through the cracks. Second, BCE 
allows artists to launch crowdfunding campaigns inviting 
fans to securely finance creative works in return for a share 
of copyright ownership in the form of a non-fungible token 
(“NFT”) or a fungible token (“FT”). It significantly diversifies 
the investment risks for artists and labels alike. Third, BCE 
cultivates a healthy ecosystem among artists and users by 
mobilizing users to mine BCE tokens through distribution 
and promotion of licensed works. These powerful incentives, 
together with BCE’s innovative enforcement mechanisms, 
may effectively eliminate the breeding ground for copyright 
piracy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Assume you want to remit $100 to your cousin in another 
city. You go to a bank to process the remittance. The bank 
tells you it needs to charge 85% of the amount as an 
administrative fee, which would leave $15 for your cousin. 
Assume you love your cousin so much that you decide to bite 
the bullet and accept the administrative fee. The bank then 
indicates that it will take at least three months, but up to a 
couple of years, for the money to arrive. By the way, if the 
bank is somehow unable to locate your cousin, it will simply 
give the money to other clients of the bank. Do you have any 
doubt about whether a bank like this, with such exorbitant 
costs and inferior services, would survive a single day in an 
ordinary market? 
However, this is the everyday reality for artists in 
copyright industries. First, for every dollar that consumers 
pay for creative works, artists often receive less than fifteen 
cents, with the rest diverted to cover administrative costs.1 
Second, labels, publishers, and collecting societies are 
usually scheduled to report accountings of copyright 
royalties on a quarterly basis. In practice, it is not uncommon 
for royalty payments to be further delayed for a couple of 
years.2 Third, it appears that 20 to 50 percent of royalty 
 
 1. See infra Figure 13. 
 2. See also Imogen Heap, Blockchain Could Help Musicians Make Money 
Again, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 5, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/blockchain-could-
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revenues never reach their rightful owners and fall into a 
black box instead. 3  If the royalties collected remain 
unclaimed for a certain amount of time (say three years), a 
collecting society is legally permitted to use the unallocated 
amount to defray administrative costs and support 
collective-purpose projects for existing members. 4  In the 
digital age where users may gain immediate access to any 
creative work with a click on the mouse, it seems absurd that 
it takes months or even years, if ever, for intermediaries to 
distribute royalty revenues to rightful owners.5 
The astonishing inefficiency in copyright industries is a 
byproduct of complicated legal and economic structures, 
which dictate that artists have to go through a web of 
hundreds, even thousands of copyright transactions to 
license creative works and collect royalties. 6  Exorbitant 
transaction costs, in the forms of administrative bureaucracy 
 
help-musicians-make-money-again. 
 3. RETHINK MUSIC, FAIR MUSIC: TRANSPARENCY AND PAYMENT FLOWS IN THE 
MUSIC INDUSTRY 26 (2015). 
 4. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Reproduction of Protected Works for University 
Research or Teaching, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 181, 195 n.43 (1992) (“Music 
performance right collecting societies such as CISAC have a long tradition of 
deducting up to ten percent of their revenue for various collective purposes.”); 
Thomas Riis & Jens Schovsbo, Extended Collective Licenses and the Nordic 
Experience: It’s a Hybrid but Is It a Volvo or a Lemon?, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
471, 492 (2010) (“[T]he practice is widespread and generally accepted due to the 
prevalence of the practice (at least in continental Europe).”); Ferdinand Melichar, 
Deductions Made by Collecting Societies for Social and Cultural Purposes in the 
Light of International Copyright Law, 22 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 
47, 49 (1991). Similarly, Spotify divided any funds left over from the pending and 
unmatched funding pools among participating publishers based on their market 
share on Spotify during the royalty period. See Ed Christman, Spotify and 
Publishing Group Reach $30 Million Settlement Agreement Over Unpaid 
Royalties, BILLBOARD (Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.billboard.com/articles 
/business/7263747/spotify-nmpa-publishing-30-million-settlement-unpaid-
royalties. 
 5. See generally BRUCE A. LEHMAN & RONALD H. BROWN, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE 
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 116 (1995) (analyzing digital 
technology and copyright law). 
 6. See Jiarui Liu, Copyright Reform and Copyright Market: A Cross-Pacific 
Perspective, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1461, 1464–65 (2016). 
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and operating expenses, gobble the majority of royalty 
revenues from existing services, cause substantial delays in 
royalty distribution, and impede accuracy in identifying 
rightful owners. 
This Article proposes a blockchain copyright exchange 
(“BCE”) to untangle the web of copyright transactions and 
unlock the digital potential for artists, by hardcoding 
thousands of copyright rules, license terms, and money flows 
through smart contracts.7 BCE may dramatically improve 
upon mainstream online services like Spotify and YouTube 
at least in the aspects of royalty collection and distribution. 
First, BCE enlarges the total pie of copyright royalties 
by restoring the market value of a stream to $0.01, almost 
three times as valuable as a Spotify stream ($0.00397) and 
fourteen times as valuable as a YouTube stream ($0.00074).8 
By minimizing the transaction costs involved in copyright 
licensing, BCE dramatically increases artists’ share in the 
royalty pie from 15 to 100 percent. As a result, BCE allows 
artists to earn per stream revenue up to sixteen times larger 
than Spotify offers and eighty times larger than YouTube 
offers. 
Second, BCE smart contracts automatically enforce the 
rights and obligations under copyright license contracts 
whenever a user intends to enjoy a creative work in the BCE 
community. After the user gains access to the work of her 
choice, BCE generates and distributes 100% of the royalty 
revenue per instruction by the copyright owner in a matter 
of seconds instead of months. Further, BCE may directly 
split the reward pro rata to enable multiple copyright owners 
including artists, labels, and publishers to receive their 
respective shares simultaneously. 
 
 7. For general introductions of smart contracts and their legal implications, 
see, for example, Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 
DUKE L.J. 313, 319 (2017); Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of 
Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 266–67 (2017); Max Raskin, The Law and 
Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 311 (2017). 
 8. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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Third, BCE smart contracts are essentially immune from 
any external influence ex post as they are self-executing on 
an immutable blockchain in accordance with predetermined 
contractual terms. This cryptographic robustness minimizes 
the risk of a breach of contract or of fiduciary duty, e.g., an 
agent sitting on or misappropriating collected royalties. No 
one has any ability or incentive to create a black box of 
unidentified royalties, because every dollar goes directly to 
copyright owners in the BCE ecosystem. 
BCE develops a variety of innovative tools based on the 
blockchain technology to prevent copyright disputes and 
combat online infringements.9 Most importantly, the BCE 
ecosystem cultivates healthy socioeconomic conditions in 
which all users, including artists and fans, are motivated to 
benefit one another, rather than fighting one another over 
copyright piracy. First, while artists receive equitable 
financial rewards in proportion to the values of their creative 
contributions, BCE keeps access to creative works 
essentially free to average consumers. Second, fans may 
share in a creative work’s commercial success by acquiring a 
portion of copyright ownership in the work in the form of a 
non-fungible token (“NFT”) or a fungible token (“FT”) and 
therefore receiving a percentage of its revenue flows. The 
copyright crowdfunding created at BCE, featuring zero 
transaction fees and improved security, is superior to 
traditional equity or reward crowdfunding.10 Third, fans may 
mine BCE tokens by distributing, promoting, and voting for 
new creative works. Unlike existing services such as 
Spotify,11 the BCE ecosystem squarely aligns the financial 
 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. For traditional crowdfunding, see generally INDIEGOGO, 
www.indiegogo.com (last visited June 27, 2021); KICKSTARTER, 
www.kickstarter.com (last visited June 27, 2021). 
 11. For legal disputes between artists and Spotify, see, for example, Sasha 
Bogursky, Taylor Swift, Garth Brooks and Other Artists Lead the Fight Against 
Spotify, FOX NEWS (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment 
/2014/11/19/taylor-swift-garth-brooks-artists-lead-fight-against-spotify/; Stuart 
Dredge, Thom Yorke Explains Why He Hates Spotify, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 7, 2013, 
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incentives between artists and fans, so that the more fans 
support artists, the more artists excel in the market, and the 
more fans benefit themselves financially. 
Part I starts with an overview of copyright industries. It 
shows how rampant copyright piracy profoundly transforms 
business models and affects artist revenue streams. Part II 
presents detailed analyses on the level of complexity in 
copyright licensing structures. Taking download and stream 
as examples, it further explains how complex copyright 
transactions incur substantial transaction costs and 
diminish creative incentives. Part III illustrates how BCE 
substantially increases incentives for artists by restoring the 
market value of creative works and automatizing copyright 
transactions through smart contracts. BCE allows artists to 
receive reasonable royalties in an amount dozens of times 
larger and at a speed millions of times faster than existing 
services offer. Part IV reveals how the BCE ecosystem 
motivates fans to actively participate in the financing, 
distribution, and promotion of new creative works. In return 
for their benevolence, fans may receive meaningful financial 
rewards through various forms of BCE token mining. Part V 
introduces blockchain-based mechanisms that BCE designs 
to improve copyright enforcement, e.g., copyright priority, 
dispute resolution, and automated investigation. It 
emphasizes that BCE is tackling the piracy problem not only 
with a stick, but also with a carrot by providing powerful 
incentives for users to move away from piracy and do the 
right thing. Part VI briefly lays out the technological 
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I. COPYRIGHT INDUSTRY LANDSCAPE 
A. Industry Overview 
Copyright industries, including music, movie, and 
publishing, have been undergoing a dramatic transformation 
in recent years, while competing with widespread pirated 
and free content on the internet. We use music as an example 
to illustrate the current landscape in copyright industries, 
and the analyses below apply equally to movies and 
literature for the most part. The music industry has 
experienced a significant slump in music sales, which 
declined over 40% between 1999 ($25.2 billion) and 2014 
($14.2 billion).12 Although digital sales have rapidly grown to 
supersede physical sales, digital sales are far from sufficient 
to offset the overall decline. For example, digital sales 
reached $9.4 billion in 2017 (Figure 1), accounting for 54% of 
total music sales.13 Of digital sales, streaming made up 70% 
and download was responsible for the rest (Figure 2).14 
  
 
 12. See IFPI, GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT 2018, at 11 (2018). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
1030 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
FIGURE 1. Global Recorded Music Industry Revenues 
1999-2017($ Billions) 
 
FIGURE 2. Global Recorded Music Revenues by  
Segment 2017 
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subsidizing less popular ones with hit sales.15 By contrast, 
copyright piracy naturally tends to focus on bestsellers, 
which undermines the revenue streams on which copyright 
owners build sustainable business models. In recent years, 
labels have started to further diversify their investment 
portfolios in the wake of increased risks in copyright 
markets.16 Labels are expanding their roles in a value chain 
beyond production, promotion, and distribution of creative 
works and reshaping their business models to be more and 
more like talent management agencies that handle and 
share revenues for all aspects of an artist’s entertainment-
related businesses, including record sales, publishing, 
touring, merchandising, sponsorship, fan clubs, official 
websites, and television and film appearances.17 These all-
encompassing deals are often called the “360-degree” model, 
by which artists essentially sign over the entirety of their 
careers during the contractual term.18 
“360-degree” deals result in several unsettling 
phenomena in the industry: First, labels prefer to sign new 
 
 15. See Paul Goldstein, Copyright, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 83; 
Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for 
Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer, 18 UCLA L. REV. 1100, 1121 (1971) 
(discussing cross-subsidization in books). 
 16. Traditionally, an artist would sign three kinds of contracts—an album 
contract, an agent contract, and a copyright contract—with three different 
entities. A record company would be responsible for production, promotion, and 
distribution of her albums. A talent agent would be responsible for managing 
performances, sponsorship, and advertisement. A music publisher would be 
responsible for handling copyright issues. Nowadays, a “360-degree” deal would 
typically incorporate all three of these contracts. 
 17. See PETER TSCHMUCK, CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 
194 (2d ed. 2012); Phil Gallo, Madonna, Live Nation Make Music, VARIETY (Oct. 
10, 2007, 5:14 PM), https://variety.com/2007/music/markets-festivals/madonna-
live-nation-make-music-1117973815/; Rosie Swash, Jay-Z to Sign Deal with Live 
Nation, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2008, 11:53 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk 
/music/2008/apr/03/jayz.urban. 
 18. For the media usage of the term “360-degree” deals, see, for example, 
Music Firms Tune into New Deals, BBC NEWS (June 30, 2008, 1:14 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7480183.stm. 
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artists at a young age and for an extended period of time.19 
Alternative revenue streams—such as touring, advertising, 
and merchandizing—in most cases entail long-term 
investment in cultivating artists’ reputations and 
influencing peripheral markets. A long-term contract would 
help recoup the heavy initial investment in young artists, 
who have less bargaining power than established artists in 
deal negotiations. 
Second, although one may presume that digital 
technologies have empowered artists with more autonomy, 
labels have actually become even closer to wielding “360-
degree” control over an artist’s creative process and even her 
personal life to maintain her commercial value in advertising 
and merchandizing markets. Not only must her works 
convey the same messages as the products promote, but the 
public image of the artist must also be consistent with 
mainstream tastes. 
Third, when labels search for new artists, they 
increasingly emphasize non-musical characteristics, such as 
attractive appearance and positive public image, again to 
accommodate the need for alternative revenue streams. If an 
artist has no potential to tour and spin off into ancillary 
forms of revenue such as advertising opportunities, labels 
may eventually pass up an otherwise unparalleled creative 
talent. 
B. Artist Revenue Streams 
Consistent with the overall trend in copyright industries, 
the importance of copyright royalties has declined as a source 
of income for individual artists because users are 
increasingly exposed to pirated and free content online. 
Artists have to look at other ways to make a living. Figure 3 
and Figure 4 illustrate the relative magnitude of various 
 
 19. Jiarui Liu, Copyright for Blockheads: An Empirical Study of Market 
Incentive and Intrinsic Motivation, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 472 (2015). 
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revenue streams as a percentage of the total income for 
artists in the United States 20  and in China. 21  Several 
similarities exist between the diagrams from the two largest 
economies in the world: First, artist revenue streams are 
highly diversified. Second, copyright royalties are not among 
the top three artist revenue streams; rather, performance 
currently generates the largest revenue. Third, 
merchandizing has yet to develop into a meaningful source 
of income for individual artists. 




 20. See Peter DiCola, Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ 
Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 301, 352 fig.2 
(2013); see generally Artist Revenue Streams, FUTURE OF MUSIC COAL. (Oct. 10, 
2010), http://futureofmusic.org/article/research/artist-revenue-streams. 
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FIGURE 4. Sources of Income for Artists (China) 
II. COPYRIGHT LICENSING STRUCTURE 
Not only are new digital technologies transforming the 
business models in copyright industries, but they are also 
dramatically increasing the level of complexity in copyright 
licensing structures.22 The following Part provides a basic 
framework of copyright ownership under current legal 
regimes. It further explains how complicated licensing 
structures incur substantial transaction costs and diminish 
creative incentives for authors. 
A. Copyright Ownership 
Taking the music industry as an example, every piece of 
recorded music usually encompasses two distinct works of 
authorship:23 (1) a musical work, which is the underlying 
composition created by the songwriter or composer, including 
any accompanying lyrics created by the lyricist; and (2) a 
sound recording, which is the audio performance of the 
 
 22. See Liu, supra note 6. 













2021] BLOCKCHAIN COPYRIGHT EXCHANGE 1035 
musical work that has been fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression. Therefore, online distribution of any recorded 
music, e.g., a song, inevitably involves copyright licenses for 
both the musical work and the sound recording. If musical 
works and sound recordings are created by different authors, 
they are often owned and licensed by different parties 
(Figure 5). 
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1. Musical Works 
The copyright in a musical work naturally vests ab initio 
in its songwriter, composer, and lyricist.24 
Any of the above authors may transfer a portion 
(traditionally 50%) or the entirety of her copyright to a music 
publisher in exchange for the following services: (1) the 
publisher may pay an advance to the musician against future 
royalties to finance the musician’s writing projects; (2) the 
publisher licenses and promotes the musical work to 
potential users; and (3) the publisher distributes copyright 
royalties to the musician after deducting the publisher’s 
share.25 In the cases where a musical work involves multiple 
musicians, each having her own publisher and contractual 
terms, it is technically difficult to precisely calculate and 
distribute license royalties among right holders. Three major 
firms, Sony/ATV Music Publishing (“Sony/ATV”), Universal 
Music Publishing Group (“UMPG”), and Warner/Chappell 
Music respectively control 25%, 21%, and 11.6% of the music 
publishing market.26 Because digital technology has lowered 
both market entry barriers to music production and 
distribution costs, the majors are faced with increasing 
competition from thousands of independent music publishers 
including Kobalt Music Group and BMG Chrysalis, which 
have in the aggregate grown from 31.6% of the market in 
2007 to 42.3% of the market in 2019.27 
Copyright law grants authors and other copyright 
owners a bundle of exclusive rights to control certain 
exploitations of their works, of which the most economically 
important ones encompass the rights to reproduce, 
 
 24. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
 25. See DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC 
BUSINESS 219–20 (8th ed. 2013). 
 26. Revenue Market Share of the Largest Music Publishers Worldwide from 
2007 to 2019, STATISTA (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/272520 
/market-share-of-the-largest-music-publishers-worldwide/. 
 27. Id. 
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distribute, and publicly perform copyrighted works. 28 
Authors and other copyright owners of musical works 
traditionally exploit different exclusive rights through 
different licensing mechanisms. 
First, copyright owners have the right to license 
reproduction and distribution of their musical works in 
phonorecords, i.e., material objects in which sound 
recordings are fixed.29 A phonorecord can be a vinyl LP, CD 
or MP3 file. Such rights are often collectively called 
mechanical rights. 30  While mechanical rights in musical 
works are subject to a compulsory license under copyright 
law, users often choose instead to obtain voluntary 
mechanical licenses through mechanical rights 
organizations (“MRO”) such as the Harry Fox Agency 
(“HFA”).31 Pursuant to the Music Modernization Act of 2018, 
the U.S. Copyright Office established The Mechanical 
Licensing Collective (“MLC”), which began administering 
blanket mechanical licenses to eligible streaming and 
download services (digital service providers or DSPs) in the 
United States in January 2021.32 
Second, musicians and publishers usually grant a 
performing rights organization (“PRO”) a nonexclusive right 
to license the public performance right in their musical 
works. 33  The PRO may offer a blanket license to users 
 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 29. See 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
 30. See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 367–68 (4th ed. 
2010). 
 31. Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual 
Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 109 (2005) (statement of 
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights) (indicating “the use of the [compulsory] 
license appears to have again became almost non-existent; up to this day, the 
Copyright Office receives very few notices of intention”) (S. Hearing 109–1021). 
 32. About Us, THE MECH. LICENSING COLLECTIVE, https://www.themlc.com 
/our-story (last visited June 28, 2021). 
 33. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 20 
(2015), http://copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music-
marketplace.pdf. 
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including websites, television and radio stations, nightclubs, 
concert halls, restaurants, and retailers to publicly perform 
all the musical works in its repertoire. In exchange, the users 
pay royalties calculated on the basis of their business scales 
and the importance of musical works to their operations. The 
PRO typically divides the royalties 50/50 between musicians 
and publishers, regardless of their co-ownership shares, after 
deducing an administrative fee. Three principal PROs, 
ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, in aggregate account for 95% of 
the licensing market for musical public performance in the 
United States.34 
Third, if a user intends to incorporate a musical work in 
an audiovisual work, such as a movie, television program, or 
videogame, she would be required to obtain a 
synchronization license directly from copyright owners. 35 
There is neither compulsory licensing nor collective 
management organizations with respect to the 
synchronization right. 
2. Sound Recordings 
The copyright in a sound recording vests ab initio in its 
creators, including featured artists (e.g., lead singers), 
nonfeatured musicians (e.g., session players), nonfeatured 
vocalists (e.g., background singers), sound engineers, and 
producers.36 
However, the above authors conventionally assign all 
their copyrights in a sound recording to the music label that 
is responsible for financing, marketing, and/or distributing 
the sound recording. In exchange, featured artists receive 
 
 34. See Diane Bartz, U.S. Justice Department to Review 1941 ASCAP, BMI 
Consent Decrees, REUTERS (June 5, 2019, 3:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com 
/article/us-usa-antitrust-ascap-bmi/u-s-justice-department-to-review-1941-
ascap-bmi-consent-decrees-idUSKCN1T62GP; Chris Versace, The Future of 
Streaming Music Rests With Congress, FOX NEWS (Jan. 10, 2016), https://www 
.foxbusiness.com/features/the-future-of-streaming-music-rests-with-congress. 
 35. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 33, at 55. 
 36. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a). 
1040 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
advances and royalties in accordance with their contracts 
with the music label; nonfeatured artists and sound 
engineers are usually paid at an hourly rate; and producers 
may be compensated by either a lump-sum fee or by a share 
out of featured artists’ royalties.37 The recording sector has a 
market structure similar to the publishing sector. There are 
three major labels, Universal Music Group (“UMG”), Sony 
Music Entertainment, Inc. (“SME”), and Warner Music 
Group (“WMG”), that respectively hold 31%, 21%, and 18% 
market shares.38 Hundreds of independent labels and artists 
combined account for 30% of record industry revenues. 39 
Further, major music labels and major music publishers are 
subject to common corporate ownership. UMPG is owned by 
UMG, the Sony Corporation owns SME and half of 
Sony/ATV, and Warner/Chappell Music is a division of 
WMG.40 
The copyright owners of sound recordings, e.g. music 
labels, directly license their reproduction and public 
distribution rights without the assistance of a collective 
rights organization or compulsory license. 41  Many online 
services, including ringtone, download, and interactive 
streaming services, inevitably involve reproduction and 
public distribution of sound recordings. They generally need 
to obtain copyright licenses from music labels. 
 
 37. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 33, at 21–22. 
 38. See Mark Mulligan, 2018 Global Label Market Share: Stream Engine, 
MIDIA (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.midiaresearch.com/blog/2018-global-label-
market-share-stream-engine. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Sebastian Torrelio, Jody Gerson Appointed Chairman and CEO of 
Universal Music Publishing Group, VARIETY (Aug. 1, 2014, 2:13 PM), 
http://variety.com/2014/biz/news/jody-gerson-appointed-chairman-and-ceo-of-
universal-music-publishing-group-1201273829; Sony Group Corp (ADR), 
REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/companies/SONY.N (last visited Sept. 3, 
2021); What We Do, WARNER CHAPPELL MUSIC, https://www.warnerchappell.com 
/what-we-do/ (last visited June 27, 2021). 
 41. Limited exceptions exist in the context of noninteractive streaming 
services that qualify for a compulsory license. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114. 
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Copyright owners enjoy a public performance right for 
sound recordings, but it is limited to digital audio 
transmission under the U.S. Copyright Act. 42  Copyright 
owners follow different licensing schemes depending on the 
technical nature of digital audio transmission. For instance, 
interactive services, such as Spotify, Apple Music, and 
Amazon Music, allow consumers to access sound recordings 
from a place and at a time individually chosen by consumers. 
Copyright owners directly license the public performance by 
interactive services through market negotiation.43 
By contrast, noninteractive services, such as Pandora, 
iHeartRadio, and Sirius XM, typically stream sound 
recordings in accordance with a schedule predetermined 
unilaterally by these services. Noninteractive services 
basically fall into three categories depending on their license 
schemes: 44  (1) nonsubscription broadcast transmissions, 
made by a FCC-licensed terrestrial broadcast station, are 
exempt from any copyright license; (2) noninteractive 
services other than nonsubscription broadcast may be 
subject to a compulsory license that allows them to publicly 
perform sound recordings, on the condition that the services 
satisfy certain statutory requirements (“compliant 
noninteractive transmissions”) and pay statutory royalties;45 
and (3) all the other noninteractive services that do not fully 
satisfy the statutory requirements are deprived of the 
compulsory license (“noncompliant noninteractive 
transmissions”), and instead need to obtain licenses directly 
from copyright owners. 
 
 42. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 43. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., COPYRIGHT LICENSING IN MUSIC DISTRIBUTION, 
REPRODUCTION, AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCE 12 (2015), https://crsreports.congress 
.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33631. 
 44. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d). 
 45. For example, such statutory requirements include prohibition of 
publishing an advance program schedule or otherwise identifying in advance 
when a specific song, album or artist will be played, and limitation of the number 
of tracks from a single album or by a particular artist that may be played during 
three hours. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(13). 
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SoundExchange, a collective management organization 
established by RIAA in 2000, is in charge of collecting 
statutory royalties from noninteractive services and, after 
deducting an administrative fee, distributing the reminders 
to copyright owners (50%), featured artists (45%), 
nonfeatured musicians (2.5%), and nonfeatured vocalists 
(2.5%).46 
Furthermore, copyright owners directly license the 
synchronization right to incorporate sound recordings in a 
movie, television program, or videogame, without going 
through any collective management organization.47 
B. Copyright License 
The following subsections present case studies of the two 
major methods of content transmission on the internet, 
including download (Figure 6) and streaming (Figure 7), to 
illustrate how complex ownership structures may create 
exorbitant transaction costs for copyright licensing and 
royalty distribution. 
1. Download 
Online download services like iTunes transmit digital 
copies of copyrighted works to end users without 
simultaneously playing the same works to users. 
Nonetheless, once the transmission is complete, users 
typically possess permanent copies in their devices and may 
play back the copies whenever they want regardless of any 
internet connection. 
First, download constitutes reproduction and 
distribution of the sound recording. Therefore, the service 
needs to obtain a direct license from the music label, which 
may demand payment of royalties set through market 
negotiation. The music label subsequently transfers a 
 
 46. See 37 C.F.R. § 380.11 (2014). 
 47. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 33, at 55–56. 
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portion (usually 10%-50%) of the royalties to the relevant 
artists in accordance with their contracts. 
Second, download involves reproduction and distribution 
of the musical work embedded in the sound recording, 
typically in the form of digital phonorecord delivery 
(“DPD”). 48  A DPD is subject to a compulsory mechanical 
license, for which the Copyright Royalty Board (“CRB”) is 
responsible for setting statutory royalty rates in lieu of 
market negotiation. 49  Online services often obtain the 
mechanical license through an MRO (e.g., MLC), which 
charges 11.5% of the royalty revenue as its administrative 
fee for distributing the royalties (9.1 cents per copy) to the 
music publisher. 50  Again, the music publisher splits the 
amount (usually 50%) with the composers. 
  
 
 48. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a). 
 49. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801–805; Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341. 
 50. FAQs, THE HARRY FOX AGENCY, https://www.harryfox.com/#/faq (last 
visited June 27, 2021); see generally Adjustment of Determination of Compulsory 
License Rates for Mechanical and Digital Phonorecords, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,938, 
67,939 (Nov. 13, 2013) (to amend 37 C.F.R. pt. 385). 
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FIGURE 6. Copyright License Structure for Download 
 
2. Streaming 
As digital streaming services like Spotify transmit 
digital copies of copyrighted works to end users, they 
automatically trigger media players to perform the same 
works to users. During the course of transmission, the 
recipient devices only temporarily store segments of the 
transmitted works in random access memory (“RAM”),51 and 
constantly rewrite the segments that have been played. At 
the end of the transmission, users are usually unable to 
retain permanent copies in their devices for further 
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playbacks, unless they are equipped with special decryption 
tools. Therefore, streaming normally requires continuous 
connection to the internet and to the streaming services if 
users want to play the works for multiple times. 
Streaming services may be interactive (e.g., on-demand 
services), which allow users to choose works to be performed, 
or non-interactive (e.g., internet radios), which perform 
works according to a predetermined schedule. 52  Spotify 
contains both components in its offerings (Figure 7). 
First, an interactive stream constitutes reproduction, 
distribution, and digital public performance of the sound 
recording streamed. It requires a direct license from the 
music label.53 The music label in turn transfers a portion 
(usually 10%-50%) of the royalties to the relevant artists in 
accordance with their contracts. 
Second, an interactive stream involves a public 
performance of the musical work underlying the sound 
recording. The streaming service usually needs to obtain a 
license from the relevant PRO. ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC 
each provide blanket licenses tailored for streaming services 
at a royalty rate of approximately 6% of their total 
revenues.54 The royalty rates offered by ASCAP and BMI are 
subject to rate-setting proceedings by the rate courts at the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York. 55  After taking approximately 11.5% of the royalty 
revenue as its administrative fee, the PRO transfers the 
remainder to the music publisher, who then splits the 
amount (usually 50%) with the relevant composers in 
 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(7). 
 53. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a). 
 54. See U.S. Music Streaming Royalties Explained, MANATT, https://www 
.manatt.com/Manatt/media/Media/PDF/US-Streaming-Royalties-Explained.pdf 
(last visited June 27, 2021). 
 55. See Orrin G. Hatch–Bob Goodlatte Music Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 
115-264, 132 Stat. 3676 (2018). 
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accordance with their contracts.56 
Third, an interactive stream entails reproduction and 
distribution of the musical work in DPD. Accordingly, the 
streaming service needs to obtain a mechanical license 
through the MRO, which transfers the royalties (i.e., at least 
10.5% of the service revenue minus the performance 
royalties) to the music publisher after withholding 11.5% as 
its administrative fee.57 The music publisher then splits the 
amount (usually 50%) with the composers in accordance with 
their contracts. 
A noninteractive stream results in a dramatically 
different licensing structure from an interactive stream. 
First, while a noninteractive stream clearly constitutes 
digital public performance of the sound recording streamed, 
it may be subject to a compulsory license if it satisfies the 
legal requirements for compliant noninteractive 
transmission. 58  SoundExchange is in charge of collecting 
statutory royalties for compliant noninteractive 
transmission. After deducting approximately 6% as its 
administrative fee, SoundExchange distributes the 
remaining royalties in accordance with the statutory scheme, 
among music labels (50%), featured artists (45%), 
nonfeatured musicians (2.5%), and nonfeatured vocalists 
(2.5%).59 
Second, a noninteractive stream that does not qualify for 
 
 56. See BMI Tops $900 Million Mark in Revenues, BMI (Aug. 25, 2008), 
http://www.bmi.com/news/entry/bmi_tops_900_million_mark_in_revenues; 
Frequently Asked Questions, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/licensing 
/licensingfaq.aspx#general (last visited June 27, 2021). 
 57. See Nina Ulloa, Exclusive: HFA Raising Its Commission to 11.5 Percent…, 
DIGIT. MUSIC NEWS (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2015/01 
/20/hfa-raising-commission-11-5-percent/. 
 58. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (detailing the legal requirements for compliant 
noninteractive transmission). 
 59. See SOUNDEXCHANGE, SOUNDEXCHANGE ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2017 
PROVIDED PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 370.5(C), at 2–3 (2017), https://www 
.soundexchange.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/2017-SoundExchange-Fiscal-
Report-FINAL-Post-Audit-SXI-Only.pdf. 
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compliant noninteractive transmission requires a direct 
license from the music label, rather than the compulsory 
license. 60  Similarly, the music label transfers a portion 
(usually 10%-50%) of the royalties to the artists in 
accordance with their contracts. 
Third, while a noninteractive stream does not constitute 
reproduction and distribution of the musical work in DPD, it 
involves a public performance of the musical work embedded 
in the sound recording. As a result, the service does not need 
any clearance for a mechanical license, but it is required to 
obtain a license from the relevant PRO at a royalty rate of 
approximately 6% of its total revenues.61 Similarly, the PRO 
distributes the royalties to the music publisher after 
deducting approximately 11.5% as its administrative fee.62 
The music publisher in turn splits the amount (usually 50%) 
with the composers in accordance with their contracts. 
  
 
 60. See Licensing 101, SOUNDEXCHANGE, https://www.soundexchange.com 
/service-provider/licensing-101/ (last visited June 27, 2021). 
 61. See Manatt, supra note 54. 
 62. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
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III. HOW BCE INCREASES INCENTIVES FOR CREATIVITY 
BCE enlarges the total pie of copyright royalties by 
restoring the market value of a BCE stream and by 
minimizing the transaction costs involved in copyright 
licensing. As a result, BCE allows artists to earn per stream 
revenue up to sixteen times larger than Spotify offers and 
eighty times larger than YouTube offers. 
A. Restoring Market Value of Creative Works 
Mainstream streaming services like Spotify and 
YouTube have been significantly devaluing creative works in 
the marketplace. When Apple initially launched the iTunes 
store in 2003, it set the price per track at $0.99. 63 
Accordingly, an album was priced at $9.90 assuming ten 
tracks in an album. After retaining 30% as its service fee, the 
iTunes store distributed 70% (i.e., $0.69 per tack) to 
copyright owners.64 In recent years, the growth of streaming 
services has crowded out the market share of download 
services due to their pricing advantages, particularly with 
regard to their free tiers.65 The public quickly realized that 
the success of streaming services was at the expense of 
declining copyright royalties. As Figure 8 indicates, Spotify 
and YouTube respectively generated $0.00397 and $ 0.00074 
per stream in 2017.66 In other words, it takes 2,494 streams 
at Spotify and 13,379 streams at YouTube to earn a payment 
equivalent to one download of an album in value. 
 
 63. See Austin Carr, Apple’s 30% Fee, an Industry Standard, Is Showing 
Cracks, BLOOMBERG (May 3, 2021, 6:45 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com 
/news/newsletters/2021-05-03/apple-s-30-fee-an-industry-standard-is-showing-
cracks. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See IFPI, supra note 12, at 6. 
 66. 2017 Streaming Price Bible! Spotify per Stream Rates Drop 9%, Apple 
Music Gains Marketshare of Both Plays and Overall Revenue, THE TRICHORDIST 
(Jan. 15, 2018), https://thetrichordist.com/2018/01/15/2017-streaming-price-
bible-spotify-per-stream-rates-drop-9-apple-music-gains-marketshare-of-both-
plays-and-overall-revenue/. 
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FIGURE 8. Copyright Royalties from Streaming Services 
(2017) 
To put this into perspective, the US national minimum wage 
currently sits at $1,160 per month (e.g., the wage for a full-
time job flipping burgers at a fast-food chain).67 Figure 9 
illustrates the number of downloads or streams a copyright 
owner needs to sell in order to earn the minimum wage, 
assuming she receives 70% of all sales revenues. 
  
 
 67. See Minimum Wage, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general 
/topic/wages/minimumwage (last visited June 27, 2021). 
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FIGURE 9. Number of Plays to Reach the Minimum Wage 
(2017) 
Minimum Wage ($1,160) from Creative Works 
 Per Month Per Year 
iTunes 167 album downloads 2004 album downloads 
Spotify 292,191 streams 3.5 million streams 
YouTube 1,567,568 streams 18.8 million streams 
Even assuming a fan downloads only one album per year, 
an artist simply needs 2,004 fans to get the minimum wage, 
and a bit over 10,000 fans to live a decent life. By contrast, 
how likely is it for an artist to earn the minimum wage by 
annually achieving 3.5 million streams at Spotify or 18.8 
million streams at YouTube? Apparently very unrealistic, 
except for a small group of superstars. 68  It suggests that 
middle-class artists who used to earn a living by a limited 
number of album sales only a decade ago would be reduced 
to part-time hobbyists until they were able to gain a 
superstar-level astronomical number of plays through 
streaming services. 
Although iTunes and Spotify both distribute 70% of their 
gross revenues to copyright owners,69 they drastically differ 
in pricing models: iTunes is an à-la-carte store selling 
creative works for per-unit prices while Spotify offers a 
“buffet” by charging every subscriber a flat fee (i.e., $9.99 per 
month) no matter how much content she consumes. The 
buffet approach allows royalty revenues to grow only with an 
 
 68. See Selling Out: How Much Do Music Artists Earn Online – 2015 Remix, 
INFORMATION IS BEAUTIFUL, https://informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/how 
-much-do-music-artists-earn-online-2015-remix/ (last visited June 27, 2021) 
(indicating that only 1.5% of Spotify users and 0.5% of Youtube users hit 
minimum wage level streams). 
 69. See, e.g., Randall Roberts, Does Spotify Pay Artists a Fair Rate? Here’s 
What Musicians, Managers and Apple Music Have to Say, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 
2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/music/story/2021-
04-19/spotify-artists-royalty-rate-apple-music. 
1052 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
increase in subscriptions, not necessarily with an increase in 
the quantity of works offered. If the increase in subscriptions 
lags behind the increase in the total number of songs, the 
royalty income per stream would actually decrease over time. 
This appears to be exactly what happened to Spotify, which 
managed to increase the number of paying subscribers by 
600% from 10 million in 2014 to 60 million in 2017;70 during 
the same period of time, its per-stream rate actually dropped 
by 23.8% from $0.00521 to $0.00397.71 
Figure 10 similarly illustrates the declining trend in 




 70. See, e.g., Number of Spotify Premium Subscribers Worldwide from 1st 
Quarter 2015 to 1st Quarter 2021, STATISTA (June 4, 2021), https://www.statista 
.com/statistics/244995/number-of-paying-spotify-subscribers/; Paul Sawers, 
Spotify’s Path to 50 Million Paying Subscribers, VENTUREBEAT (Mar. 3, 2017, 5:38 
AM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/03/03/spotifys-path-to-50-million-paying-
subscribers/. 
 71. See THE TRICHORDIST, supra note 66; see also Streaming Price Index 
Updated 2014 : Per Stream Pay Rates, THE TRICHORDIST (Feb. 20, 2014), 
https://thetrichordist.com/2014/02/20/streaming-price-index-updated-2014-per-
stream-pay-rates/. 
 72. If Only Artists and Managers Had Listened To Us : Spotify Per Stream 
Rates Keep Dropping, THE TRICHORDIST (May 18, 2017), https://thetrichordist 
.com/2017/05/18/if-only-artists-and-managers-had-listened-to-us-spotify-per-
stream-rates-keep-dropping/. 
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FIGURE 10. Spotify Copyright Royalties per Stream (2011-
2015) 
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BCE chooses not to follow the subscription models 
popular among mainstream streaming services, given their 
unintended effect of devaluing creative works. Instead, BCE 
strives to return to the à-la-carte model for artists while 
maintaining access to content essentially free to average 
consumers.73 For instance, BCE uniformly emits BCE tokens 
in the value of $0.01 per stream, almost three times as 
valuable as a Spotify stream ($0.00397) and fourteen times 
as valuable as a YouTube stream ($0.00074).74 
More importantly, BCE rejuvenates consumer demands 
for a BCE download, which is consistently valued at $1, i.e., 
100 times a BCE stream. A download is tied to BCE token 
mining in the forms of marketing and distributing creative 
works. By doing so, not only does a download bring strong 
royalty revenues to artists, but it also generates financial 
returns to miners who contribute valuable attention, 
processing power, and storage space. 
B. Minimizing Transaction Costs 
As much as the $0.00397 per stream that Spotify 
allocates to the pool of copyright royalties undervalues 
creativity, it is virtually impossible for the artists who 
produced the relevant works to receive the entirety of that 
$0.00397.75 In practice, the legal and economic structures in 
copyright industries dictate that artists have to go through a 
complex web of hundreds, even thousands of copyright 
contracts to license creative works and collect royalties.76 
Exorbitant transaction costs, in the forms of administrative 
fees and operating expenses, gobble the majority of royalty 
 
 73. BCE implements an innovative freemium model in which users who 
access works for free may still generate values for authors. 
 74. See THE TRICHORDIST, supra note 66. 
 75. These analyses apply equally to other content services such as Apple and 
YouTube. 
 76. See generally Peter Tschmuck, Copyright, Contracts, and Music 
Production, 12 INFO. COMMC’N & SOC’Y 251 (2009). 
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revenues from online services. Figure 11 illustrates the flows 
of copyright licenses and royalties in a single song “Uptown 
Funk.”77 
FIGURE 11.Copyright Topography of Uptown Funk 
 
 77. Jesse Feister, The Music Data Debacle: Natural Workflows Can Power a 
Faster, Smarter Music Industry, MEDIUM (Mar. 16, 2016), https://medium.com 
/@flashfeister/the-music-data-debacle-you-re-already-fixing-it-482ee18cfead. 
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For instance, we may assume the best-case scenario 
where an artist writes, performs, and produces her works all 
by herself, which suggests she is likely to be the initial owner 
of 100% copyrights in her sound recordings and musical 
compositions. The key question is what percentage of royalty 
revenues the all-around artist may receive from online 
services, after deducting all the costs involved in financing, 
marketing, and distributing her works and in collecting and 
allocating copyright royalties. 
For every dollar Spotify receives from its users, it 
typically withholds 29.3 cents for itself, distributes 58.5 cents 
to music labels, 6 cents to MROs (e.g., MLC), and 6.12 cents 
to PROs (e.g., ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC).78 
FIGURE 12. Interactive Streaming Service Revenue 
Distribution 
 
If the artist has signed a recording contract with a major 
label and a publishing contract with a major publisher, the 
label transfers approximately 16% of royalty revenues for 
sound recordings (i.e., 9.36 cents) to the signed artist. 79 
 
 78. See Manatt, supra note 54. 
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MROs and PROs are responsible for collecting royalties for 
music compositions and respectively charge 11.5% as their 
administrative fees. 80  Afterwards, they distribute the 
remainder to the writer and the publisher typically by 
splitting the amount 50/50, resulting in 5.37 cents for each.81 
Therefore, for every dollar consumers pay Spotify for content, 
the signed artist may receive only 14.73 cents (Figure 13). 
FIGURE 13. Artist/Writer Revenues from Interactive 
Streaming (Major Labels) 
Sound Recordings Mechanicals Performances 
Label’s Share 
58.5 × (1 – 16%) = 49.14 
Collecting Society 
6 × 11.5%= 0.69 
Collecting Society 
6.12 × 11.5% = 0.7 
Artist’s Share 
58.5 × 16% = 9.36 
Publisher’s Share 
(6 – 0.69) × 50% = 2.66 
Publisher’s Share 
(6.12 – 0.7) × 50% = 2.71 
 
Writer’s Share 
(6 – 0.69) × 50% = 2.66 
Writer’s Share 
(6.12 – 0.7) × 50% = 2.71 
Total = 9.36 + 2.66 + 2.71 = 14.7382 
If the artist has signed a record deal with an independent 
label and an administrative agreement with a publisher, the 
label normally splits its royalty revenues 50/50 with the 
independent artist,83 who therefore receives 29.25 cents for 
sound recordings. Again, MROs and PROs respectively 
charge 11.5% as their administrative fees. 84  Of the 
remaining funds, the publisher typically withholds 10% as 
its administrative fee, and remits 90%, i.e., 9.66 cents, to the 
writer.85 Therefore, for every dollar consumers pay Spotify 
 
 80. See supra notes 50, 56 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Todd Brabec & Jeff Brabec, Songwriter and Music Publisher 
Agreements, ASCAP, https://www.ascap.com/help/music-business-101/200809 
(last visited June 27, 2021). 
 82. Traditional download services generated a similar share for major 
artists/writers: (70 – 9.1) × 16% + 9.1 × (1 – 11.5%) × 50% = 13.77. 
 83. Manatt, supra note 54. 
 84. See supra notes 50, 56 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Brabec & Brabec, supra note 81. 
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for content, the independent artist may only receive 38.91 
cents (Figure 14). 
FIGURE 14. Artist/Writer Revenues from Interactive 
Streaming (Independent Labels) 
Sound Recordings Mechanicals Performances 
Label’s Share 
58.5 × (1 – 50%) = 49.14 
Collecting Society 
6 × 11.5%= 0.69 
Collecting Society 
6.12 × 11.5% = 0.7 
Artist’s Share 
58.5 × 50% = 29.25 
Publisher’s Share 
(6 – 0.69) × 10% = 0.53 
Publisher’s Share 
(6.12 – 0.7) × 10% = 0.54 
 
Writer’s Share 
(6 – 0.69) × 90% = 4.78 
Writer’s Share 
(6.12 – 0.7) × 90% = 4.88 
Total = 29.25 + 4.78 + 4.88 = 38.9186 
If the artist handles recording and publishing all by 
herself, she may receive 90% of the royalty revenues for 
sound recordings after paying approximately 10% 
commission to online distributors (e.g., CD Baby). 87 
Meanwhile, she may receive both the writer’s and publisher’s 
shares of the remaining royalties for musical compositions 
after MROs and PROs deduct their administrative fees. 
Therefore, for every dollar consumers pay Spotify for content, 
the DIY artist may receive 63.38 cents (Figure 15). 
  
 
 86. Traditional download services generated a similar share for independent 
artists/writers: (70 – 9.1) × 50% + 9.1 × (1 – 11.5%) × 90% = 37.70. 
 87. See CD Baby or TuneCore, CD BABY, https://cdbaby.com/cdbaby-vs-
tunecore.aspx (last visited June 27, 2021). 
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FIGURE 15. Artist/Writer Revenues from Interactive 
Streaming (Independent Artists) 
Sound Recordings Mechanicals Performances 
Distributor’s Share 
58.5 × (1 – 90%) = 5.85 
Collecting Society 
6 × 11.5%= 0.69 
Collecting Society 
6.12 × 11.5% = 0.7 
Artist’s Share 
58.5 × 90% = 52.65 
Writer’s Share 
(6 – 0.69) × 100% = 5.31 
Writer’s Share 
(6.12 – 0.7) × 100% = 5.42 
Total = 52.65 + 5.31 + 5.42 = 63.3888 
Labels, publishers, and collecting societies 
conventionally report accountings of copyright royalties on a 
quarterly basis.89 As a result of the complexity in licensing 
structures, they are sometimes unable to quickly identify 
and locate all relevant copyright owners. In practice, it is not 
uncommon for royalty payments to be delayed by a couple of 
years. A Grammy Award winning artist once lamented that 
“creatives in the music industry—such as songwriters, 
producers and musicians—. . . are the first to put in any of 
the work, and the last to ever see any profit.”90 
In accordance with a report released by the Berklee 
College of Music, 20 to 50 percent of royalty revenues never 
reached their rightful owners and fell into a black box 
instead. 91  One of the major reasons appears to be that 
collecting societies that work with online services may have 
enough incentives to collect royalties but not enough to locate 
their copyright owners and distribute royalties. For one 
thing, if the money collected is negligible and hardly covers 
searching costs, a collecting society would naturally be 
 
 88. Traditional download services generated a similar share for DYI 
artists/writers: (70 – 9.1) × 90% + 9.1 × (1 – 11.5%) × 100% = 62.86. 
 89. See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53 
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 673, 682 n.38 (2003). 
 90. Heap, supra note 2. The statement is more relevant to independent artists 
than signed artists who may receive advances from labels before production 
starts. 
 91. See RETHINK MUSIC, supra note 3, at 16, 26. 
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unwilling to search for copyright owners. For another thing, 
if the royalties are substantial, a collecting society could 
arguably have even less incentive to locate recipients: If the 
royalties collected remain unclaimed for a certain amount of 
time (say three years), a collecting society would be legally 
permitted to use the unallocated amount to defray 
administrative costs, 92  and support collective-purpose 
projects for existing members in the form of awards or 
stipends.93 Such a windfall suggests that collecting societies 
may financially benefit by sitting on the royalties collected 
for unidentified copyright owners. 
To sum up, current licensing models of online content 
services incur extensive transaction costs, cause substantial 
delays in royalty distribution, and lack accuracy in 
identifying rightful owners. 
In the early digital age, legal scholars popularized the 
buzz phrase “code is law,” which suggests that computer code 
may increasingly supersede law as a predominant force 
regulating human behaviors in cyberspace.94 However, the 
experiences of online services such as Spotify and YouTube 
reveal that technological innovation alone, disconnected 
from legal and social norms, would not spontaneously 
promote justice, fairness, and social welfare. The advent of 
the blockchain technology reminds us that computer code 
may also be implemented to automatically enforce legal rules 
and contractual terms. To this extent, law is code. 
In particular, blockchain-based smart contracts have a 
key advantage. Traditionally, laws and contracts are 
enforced ex post through the judicial system. Taking 
copyright infringement as an example, anybody technically 
 
 92. See, e.g., General FAQs, SOUNDEXCHANGE, https://www.soundexchange 
.com/about/general-faqs/ (last visited June 27, 2021). 
 93. See Ginsburg, supra note 4; Riis & Schovsbo, supra note 4; Melichar, 
supra note 4. 
 94. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Code Is Law, HARV. MAG. (Jan. 1, 2000), 
https://www.harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law-html. 
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has the liberty to distribute a movie online no matter 
whether she obtains a license or pays a royalty. Only if she 
does so without a proper license would a court intervene and 
impose injunctive relief and monetary damages. 95  By 
contrast, smart contracts enforce legal and contractual 
obligations ex ante by technological means rather than the 
threat of legal sanctions. When a user is playing a movie, 
smart contracts would automatically conclude a license 
contract and remit a payment to the copyright owner. As a 
result, it would technologically be more difficult and less 
efficient for average users to violate the law than to follow 
the law. By discouraging and preventing illegal behaviors in 
the first place, smart contracts avoid the substantial social 
costs involved in legal proceedings comprised of lawyers, 
police officers, and judges.96 
BCE is exactly such a legal and technological ecosystem 
that enlists the blockchain technology to hardcode thousands 
of copyright rules, license agreements, and money flows 
through smart contracts. BCE has at least three advantages 
over mainstream streaming services in terms of royalty 
collection and distribution. 
First, BCE may eliminate the transaction costs that 
artists have to assume in traditional methods of copyright 
licenses. Therefore, artists wield 100% control over all the 
royalties paid for their works, as opposed to the 14.73% 
traditionally available after deducting transaction costs for 
financing, marketing, and licensing.97 
 
 95. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
 96. Taking traffic law as another example, a person is normally free to drive 
at whatever speed she wants. A court would not intervene and impose a fine until 
she is caught exceeding the speed limit. However, we may sometimes need to 
prevent people from driving too fast by architectural means, e.g., building speed 
bumps. Notably, technological measures improving law enforcement may 
sometimes impede “efficient breaches” where the social benefit of breaching the 
law overrides the social costs. For example, one may have to exceed a speed limit 
to save others. 
 97. See supra Figure 14. 
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Second, while users may immediately access any 
creative work on mainstream online services with a click on 
the mouse, it seems absurd that it takes months or even 
years for these services to distribute royalty revenues to 
rightful copyright owners, if ever. By contrast, whenever a 
user streams or downloads a creative work in the BCE 
community, smart contracts automatically enforce copyright 
licenses without any human intervention. Within a matter of 
seconds, BCE generates BCE tokens worth $0.01 per stream 
or $1 per download and distributes 100% of the revenue per 
instruction by relevant copyright owners on the blockchain. 
Furthermore, BCE may directly split the reward pro rata 
among the copyright owners. For example, each member in 
a four-piece band may simultaneously receive twenty-five 
cents out of every dollar received if so agreed. 
Third, as BCE smart contracts are self-executing on an 
immutable blockchain in accordance with predetermined 
contractual terms, they are essentially immune from any 
external influence ex post. This cryptographic robustness 
minimizes the risk of a breach of contract or fiduciary duty, 
e.g., an agent sitting on or misappropriating collected 
royalties. Nobody has any incentive or ability to create a 
black box of unidentified royalties, as every dollar goes 
directly to copyright owners in the BCE community. 
IV. HOW BLOCKCHAIN REWARDS USER CONTRIBUTION 
BCE cultivates a healthy ecosystem in which all users, 
including artists and fans, are motivated to benefit one 
another by actively participating in the BCE community: 
Artists receive various forms of financial rewards in 
proportion to the values of their creative contribution. Fans 
may share in the commercial success by acquiring a portion 
of copyright ownership in a creative work and therefore 
receiving a percentage of revenue flows. Additionally, fans 
may mine BCE tokens by hosting, promoting, and voting for 
creative works. In a nutshell, the BCE ecosystem squarely 
aligns the pecuniary incentives between artists and fans, to 
2021] BLOCKCHAIN COPYRIGHT EXCHANGE 1063 
the extent that the more fans support artists, the more 
artists excel in the market, and the more fans may benefit 
themselves financially. 
A. Diversifying Investment Risks 
It is not uncommon to hear the complaint that labels 
exploit artists in record deals by taking the lion’s share of 
copyright royalties, often in the range of 80 to 90 percent.98 
Nonetheless, this practice has been rational and justifiable 
in the face of significant investment risks in copyright 
industries. The basic functions of major labels in a value 
chain conventionally revolve around financing and 
coordinating production, promotion, and distribution of 
creative works. According to a recent study, labels invest a 
total of $4.5 billion annually in artists and repertoire and 
marketing, accounting for 27% of their total revenues.99 A 
major label typically spends between $0.5 million to $2 
million upfront in discovering, developing, and promoting an 
emerging artist in the U.S. Market. 100  Figure 16 breaks 
down the investment: 
FIGURE 16. Typical Investment in New Artists 
Typical Investment in a New Artist 
Advance $50,000-$350,000 
Recording $150,000-$500,000 
Video production $50,000-$300,000 
Tour Support $50,000-$150,000 
Marketing and Promotion $200,000-$700,000 
Total $500,000-$2,000,000 
 
 98. See, e.g., David Lowery, Meet the New Boss, Worse Than the Old Boss?, 
THE TRICHORDIST (Apr. 15, 2012), https://thetrichordist.com/2012/04/15/meet-the-
new-boss-worse-than-the-old-boss-full-post/. 
 99. IFPI, Investing in Music: The Value of Record Companies, RIAA (2016), 
https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ifpi-iim-report-2016.pdf. 
 100. Id. 
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As indicated above, an artist typically signs a recording 
contract with a major label in exchange for its upfront 
investment. The recording contract usually allocates 10 to 50 
percent of copyright royalties to the artist while the label 
retains the remainder. More importantly, it allows the label 
to use the artist’s share to fully recoup its investment in the 
advance (often including recording and music video) before it 
actually starts to transfer any royalty to the artist.101 For 
example, a recording contract requires the label to give the 
artist an advance of $100,000 and allocate 10% of copyright 
royalties to the artist; additionally, the artist must pay back 
the $100,000 advance out of her 10% share. As a result, if an 
album is priced at $10 per copy, the artist needs to sell at 
least 100,000 copies before she sees a penny of copyright 
royalty, while the label receives $1 million royalties and 
makes a $900,000 profit. 
Meanwhile, there is a high degree of uncertainty in 
consumer preferences inherent in the market of creative 
works. Some labels estimated that only one or two out of ten 
albums may achieve commercial success, while the rest are 
unable to recoup their own costs. 102  In response to the 
investment risks, traditional labels operate a lot like venture 
capitalists to the extent that they invest in a large portfolio 
of varied creative works in the hope of cross-subsidizing less 
popular works with the lucrative revenues from 
bestsellers.103 In other words, the share of copyright royalties 
from a successful project has to be large enough to cover the 
costs of up to ten projects in order for a label to retain its 
financial soundness and long-run sustainability. Therefore, 
the $900,000 markup from one project is essentially a 
breakeven point in light of the whole portfolio of ten projects 
invested. 
BCE enables artists and labels to diversify investment 
 
 101. Notably, the recoupment usually doesn’t cover marketing and promotion. 
 102. See Liu, supra note 19, at 493. 
 103. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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risks by inviting their fanbases to invest in future or existing 
works. In exchange, the fans turn into sponsors who are 
entitled to a percentage of royalty revenues derived from 
these works. The blockchain-based crowdfunding may 
benefit all the parties involved. First, artists do not have to 
relinquish copyright ownership in their creative works in 
order to obtain financing. Instead, they may wield stronger 
control over their works and enjoy increased shares of 
copyright royalties. Second, labels take less financial risk 
during the creative process. Therefore, they may better focus 
their attention on developing new artists, producing and 
marketing new works. Third, fans may share in the market 
success of creative works of their choices as sponsors. The 
high transparency and low transaction costs on the 
blockchain ensure that a sponsor receives a substantial 
stream of royalty revenues as a result of superior taste and 
vision. It brings immense satisfaction both financially and 
emotionally. 
The crowdfunding procedures in the BCE community 
consist mainly of the following steps. First, a publisher such 
as an artist or label, who first brings her work into the BCE 
community, may offer a percentage of copyright ownership 
in her work in the form of NFT or FT for the crowdfunding 
purpose. The crowdfunding option is not applicable if she is 
not a publisher who first brings her work into the BCE 
community. In these cases, BCE only allows a single party to 
take over the entire portion offered through sales or auction 
to avoid excessive fragmentation in copyright ownership.104 
Publishers may launch crowdfunding campaigns both within 
the BCE community and through other channels including 
 
 104. Over-fragmentation may lead to the holdout problem. See, e.g., Guido 
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1107 (1972). 
Similar issues are sometimes called the tragedy of “anticommons.” See Michael 
A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx 
to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623–24 (1998); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca 
S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical 
Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998). 
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social media by means of embedded widgets. 
Second, all members in the BCE community are invited 
to bid for sponsorship of any works offered. For each work, 
BCE implements a combination of advanced auction tactics 
including English auction and Vickrey auction to make sure 
that the new work receives sufficient funding. 105  For 
example, we may designate the highest bidder as the winner, 
who however needs to pay the amount offered by the second 
highest bidder. BCE allows a maximum of five hundred 
sponsors, who are generally the top five hundred bidders. 
The others do not have to return empty-handed. Instead, 
they may choose to use a portion (e.g., $1) out of their initial 
bids to purchase a presale copy enabling them to eventually 
mine BCE tokens at an accelerated rate (e.g., 30% faster 
than a normal rate). 
Third, during and immediately after the bidding process, 
all the funding would be temporarily stored in an escrow 
account on the BCE blockchain. A publisher may propose a 
numerical threshold for crowdfunding. If the total amount 
falls short of reaching the threshold during a set period of 
time, all the funding would be automatically returned to the 
original bidders. If the threshold is reached and the work has 
been published before crowdfunding, BCE smart contracts 
will release the funding to the publisher and simultaneously 
transfer the shares of copyright royalties pro rata to the 
winning bidders. If a work otherwise has yet to be produced, 
BCE smart contracts would first release 35% of the total 
funds to the publisher to cover the production costs. BCE 
would release the remaining 65% after the work is published 
and more than 50% shares of the winning bidders approve of 
the published work. 
Fourth, the winning bidders split the percentage of 
copyright royalties offered pro rata according to their 
respective amounts. If there is only one winner, such as in 
 
 105. See generally VIJAY KRISHNA, AUCTION THEORY 91–101, 178–79 (2d ed. 
2010) (discussing the English and Vickrey auctions). 
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the case of less than 30% offered, she would receive the whole 
share. BCE smart contracts in turn distribute all royalty 
revenues in the BCE community to artists, labels, and 
sponsors in proportion to their respective shares. 
Fifth, those who acquire through crowdfunding shares of 
copyright ownership in any works are free to transfer their 
shares in the secondary market. Nevertheless, BCE smart 
contracts allow a publisher or any other owner to set the 
duration of a transfer up to thirty-five years so that the 
transferred ownership will revert to herself after a certain 
number of years at her discretion. As a result, if a user 
acquires 30% ownership in a work for three years, after a 
year, she would be able to transfer only the remaining two 
years of ownership. 
Crowdfunding business models, such as Kickstarter and 
RocketHub, actually predated the blockchain technology. 
However, the blockchain technology dramatically minimizes 
the financial risks and costs involved in large-scale 
crowdfunding transactions. First, typical crowdfunding 
services have to charge around 5% as administrative fees or 
payment processing fees. 106  The blockchain technology 
enables BCE to avoid a centralized credit card system and 
reduce the relevant fees to zero. 
Second, BCE smart contracts have incorporated 
applicable copyright and corporation rules in major legal 
jurisdictions to fulfill the ultimate vision of “law is code.” 
Therefore, BCE offers a crowdfunding platform with an 
unprecedented level of legal compliance. For example, while 
certain countries impose complex legal requirements on 
equity crowdfunding,107 BCE instead designs a new model of 
 
 106. See, e.g., Fees for the United States, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter 
.com/help/fees (last visited June 27, 2021). 
 107. See, e.g., SEC, The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, 
INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics 
/role-sec/laws-govern-securities-industry (last visited June 27, 2021). 
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crowdfunding relying on copyright divisibility.108 A copyright 
owner may transfer her entitlement to a work to multiple 
users without the typical legal hurdles in the equity and 
securities markets. Copyright crowdfunding among 
numerous users has been legally possible but economically 
unrealistic until the blockchain technology diminished the 
transaction costs in complex copyright licensing. 
Third, BCE smart contracts minimize the risks of 
funding misappropriation. The accumulated funding would 
be stored in blockchain-based escrow accounts out of reach to 
artists until artists have delivered the promised works 
approved by the majority of the winning bidders. 
Subsequently, remittance of funding and transfer of 
copyright ownership are both self-executing, immune from 
any human intervention. 
Fourth, the current U.S. Copyright Act of 1976 allows 
authors the possibility of terminating copyright assignment 
or license agreements after thirty-five years.109 However, the 
notification formalities required to trigger the termination 
are so complicated as to make termination virtually 
impossible in practice. 110  BCE smart contracts use 
automation to greatly simplify termination formalities and 
make the legal benefit accessible to authors. 
Fifth, BCE copyright crowdfunding provides investors 
with a stable stream of revenues. Conventional 
crowdfunding models either grant equity in a startup that 
produces minimal dividends and is difficult to cash out, or 
give away rewards of value no more than a souvenir or a 
product presale.111 By contrast, BCE copyright crowdfunding 
 
 108. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1)–(2) (codifying the divisibility of 
copyright). 
 109. 17 U.S.C. § 203(3). 
 110. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 683 F.2d 610, 618–19 
(2d Cir. 1982); Milne ex rel. Coyne v. Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 111. Carol Benovic & Sid Orlando, Need Some Reward Ideas? Here Are 96 of 
Them, KICKSTARTER (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/need-
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results in a continuous and automated distribution of 
substantial royalty revenues to all sponsors. 
We may readily extend the models of copyright 
crowdfunding and copyright mining to live performance 
either online or offline. Traditionally, a touring artist often 
takes an educated guess on which cities may have a good 
turnout for her concerts. Once she starts to sell concert 
tickets through ticketing agencies like Ticketmaster, it may 
turn out that some cities do not have audiences large enough 
to justify the costs of performing a concert. In these cases, 
the artist has to cancel the dates, refund all the tickets sold, 
and pay ticketing agencies for their administrative fees 
nonetheless. Copyright crowdfunding may provide a solution 
to such an information asymmetry. First, the touring artists 
or other event organizers may publish an upcoming event in 
the BCE community. Organizers may offer 30% or more of 
ownership and revenues for crowdfunding. Additionally, 
they may offer ticket presales to the general public. Second, 
if organizers have not secured a hosting venue yet, they may 
offer a percentage (e.g., 10%) of ownership and revenues to a 
potential host. Third, BCE may generate a specific hyperlink 
to ticket sales for each ticketholder, who is then able to mine 
BCE tokens (e.g., 20%) by promoting and distributing the 
hyperlink to other potential audiences on various social 
media. Fourth, all the payments are tentatively stored in an 
escrow account on the BCE blockchain. Organizers may set 
a threshold for each city. If the sales do not reach the 
threshold, all the payments would be refunded 
automatically. If the sales reach the threshold, BCE smart 
contracts would directly distribute the revenues to relevant 
copyright owners, hosts, and promoters. Fifth, the tickets 
sold may be freely transferred within the BCE community 
ahead of time. If the resale generates a premium, the original 
ticketholder needs to share 30% with the organizers. Sixth, 
BCE will release the tickets in the form of a barcode an hour 
 
some-reward-ideas-here-are-96-of-them (providing a list of potential rewards to 
give to Kickstarter campaign investors). 
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prior to the event in order to prevent ticket forgery. 
B. Democratizing Talent Discovery 
Marketing is usually the largest operating cost for a 
major label, which may spend between $200,000 and 
$700,000 in order to effectively promote an emerging artist 
to the general audience.112 In total, major labels annually 
invest $1.7 billion, i.e., around 10% of their total revenues, in 
marketing and promotion. 113  Independent labels and 
individual artists rarely have the financial resources 
necessary to launch extensive marketing campaigns, e.g., in 
the form of payola to radio and television stations. 114 
Therefore, the utmost question for many emerging and 
alternative artists is how to engage fans around the world in 
the absence of substantial funding. BCE provides artists and 
labels with innovative mining mechanisms to mobilize their 
fanbases to promote creative works through the viral effects 
of crowdsourcing and social media. BCE users may take at 
least three measures to mine BCE tokens on the basis of 
their respective contributions to the marketing and 
distribution of creative works. 
1. Mining by Hosting 
Once a user downloads a copy of a work, she may serve 
as a “hosting miner” by setting her copy as a “node” that 
supplies feeds to other users who stream or download the 
same work.115 All the hosting miners whose nodes facilitate 
a stream or download would jointly be entitled to an 
additional 10% of the BCE tokens allocated to its copyright 
 
 112. See IFPI, supra note 100. 
 113. Id. 
 114. But see R. H. Coase, Payola in Radio and Television Broadcasting, 22 J.L. 
& ECON. 269, 315 (1979). 
 115. Mining by hosting depends essentially on a protocol like InterPlanetary 
File System (IPFS). For the IPFS open-source information, see IPFS Powers the 
Distributed Web, GITHUB, https://github.com/ipfs/ipfs (last visited June 27, 2021). 
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owners. This mining approach would be particularly 
attractive for users having excess processing power or 
bandwidth. 
2. Mining by Linking 
A user who downloads a copy of a work may obtain from 
BCE a widget that uniquely associates with the particular 
user and embeds a hyperlink to the particular work. She may 
distribute the widget, e.g., as part of a commentary or 
playlist, within the BCE community and through social 
media such as Facebook, Twitter, and WeChat. If another 
user downloads or streams a work through her widget, she 
would be entitled to an additional 20% of the BCE tokens 
allocated to its copyright owners for serving as a “linking 
miner.” 
3. Mining by Voting 
The third channel of mining BCE tokens invites users to 
act as “voting miners” who influence the rankings of all the 
works published in the BCE community. The voting system 
is set up in response to the fact that the emission of new BCE 
tokens in proportion to the number of streams and 
downloads may not fully reflect how much weight consumers 
allocate to each work if each stream or download is uniformly 
priced at $0.01 or $1. Traditionally, a seller often engages in 
price discrimination strategies to gauge the maximum 
amount that a buyer is willing to hand over to procure a 
product or service, which is also referred to as “willingness 
to pay” (“WTP”).116 Accordingly, we may calculate the total 
market value of a work by multiplying its market width, 
 
 116. For detailed discussions of price discrimination, see generally Mark 
Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination, in 2 
ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 97 
(Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey & Torsten Persson eds., 2006); Lars A. 
Stole, Price Discrimination and Competition, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 2221 (Mark Armstrong & Robert H. Porter eds., 2007); Hal R. 
Varian, Price Discrimination, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 597 
(Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989). 
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defined as the total number of users who consume the work, 
with its market depth, defined as the average WTP that each 
user allocates to the work. 
BCE implements an innovative voting and ranking 
system in the blockchain context to gather WTP information 
beyond the number of streams and downloads. BCE releases 
a series of weekly charts that rank the most valuable works 
(e.g., Top 100) in different genres. 117  The ranking 
methodologies depend on a combination of the following 
three elements: First, the total value of streams and 
downloads during a week accounts for 35% of the ranking 
score allocated to a work in all the relevant charts. Second, a 
user may vote for or against any work with regard to any 
weekly chart in which it may potentially appear. 118  Each 
vote is weighted by the BCE tokens that the voter has spent 
to back her vote. The total weighted value of both positive 
and negative votes accounts for 35% of the ranking score. We 
may disregard top 1% of positive and negative votes to 
minimize the risks of voting manipulation. Third, a qualified 
artist may opt to vote for or against any work as a critic, 
rather than as a user. A critic vote would not cost any BCE 
tokens and therefore would not be weighted.119  The total 
value of positive and negative critic votes accounts for 30% of 
the ranking score in all the relevant charts. 
All the works are ranked in the weekly charts according 
to their ranking scores.120 If a work has moved upwards in a 
 
 117. All the works may fall into one of the three categories: music, video, and 
literature. A work may be listed only in one category. Each category has a unified 
chart and five genre charts. A work may fall into a unified chart and one of the 
genre charts within a category. 
 118. This means a user may vote for the same work multiple times in different 
charts, with different directions and different BCE tokens. 
 119. We may select as critics all artists who meet the threshold of works 
published (e.g., 10) and/or streams and downloads (e.g., $100). Alternatively, we 
may select top 100 artists or randomly select 100 critics from the artists who meet 
the threshold. 
 120. If multiple works happen to have the same ranking score, the tiebreaker 
would be the total value of streams and downloads, then the total weighted value 
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chart, the BCE tokens from the positive voters would not 
change hands, and the BCE tokens from the negative voters 
would be divided between the relevant artists (35%), the 
positive voters (35%), and the positive critics (30%). 121 
Similarly, if a work has moved downwards, the BCE tokens 
from the negative voters would not change hands, and the 
BCE tokens from the positive voters would be divided 
between the relevant artists (35%), the negative voters 
(35%), and the negative critics (30%). If a work has stayed 
put, the tiebreaker would be the change in the total value of 
streams and downloads, then the change in the total 
weighted value of votes, and then the change in the total 
value of critic votes. 
V. HOW BCE IMPROVES COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 
BCE develops a variety of innovative tools based on the 
blockchain technology to prevent copyright disputes, combat 
online infringements, and cultivate socioeconomic conditions 
against copyright piracy. First, the BCE blockchain produces 
immutable hashes of copyright ownership information to 
establish copyright priority and facilitate copyright 
registration; second, BCE streamlines the procedures for 
third parties to obtain copyright licenses for user generated 
content and other derivative works; third, BCE reshapes 
notice-and-takedown procedures to resolve copyright 
disputes in a cost-effective way, improving upon the existing 
system under the U.S. Copyright Act; 122  fourth, BCE 
automates searching and detection of online infringements 
through a blockchain-based search engine and bounty 
system; fifth, and most importantly, BCE is tackling the 
piracy problem not only with a stick, but also with a carrot 
 
of votes, and then the total value of critic votes. 
 121. The rewards for the positive voters are distributed in proportion to their 
investments of BCE tokens. The rewards for the positive critics are divided 
equally. 
 122. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512 (setting forth the notice and takedown 
system for copyrighted material online). 
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by providing powerful incentives for users to move away from 
copyright piracy and do the right thing: it is highly 
convenient and mostly free for average users to enjoy 
licensed creative works in the BCE community. 
Furthermore, BCE users are motivated to actively sponsor, 
distribute, and promote new creative works taking comfort 
in the fact that BCE aspires to reward their benevolence 
financially through the mining of BCE tokens and confer 
100% of the royalty revenues on artists. 
A. Copyright Priority 
Copyright ownership information is readily accessible, 
transparent, and immutable on the BCE blockchain. Once an 
artist publishes her work in the BCE community, BCE 
automatically generates a series of hashes through a Merkle 
tree consisting of its digital fingerprint and copyright 
ownership information, such as who are copyright owners, 
how copyright royalties are to be split, and how long 
copyrights last. The BCE blockchain stores these hashes 
with a timestamp as prima facie evidence of copyright 
ownership. The blockchain record documenting a work 
published by a particular author at a particular time is 
useful to obtain a registration at the Copyright Office and to 
prove legal standing in copyright litigation.123 A publisher 
has the option to proceed with the official copyright 
registration automated through the BCE blockchain, 
preferably within three months of publication.124 
In the meantime, the blockchain record establishes a 
copyright priority in the BCE community. When another 
user intends to publish a new work subsequently, BCE will 
scan the new work looking for a match between its digital 
 
 123. See 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)–(c). 
 124. When registration is made within three months after publication of a 
work, a copyright owner is eligible for statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, and 
costs. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 1 COPYRIGHT BASICS 5 (2021), 
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf. 
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fingerprint and that of any preexisting work. BCE would 
automatically block the new work if a match is found, unless 
the original owner has approved the new work through the 
procedures set forth in Section V.B.125 
Even if a new work is blocked, it may not necessarily 
mean that it infringes upon the copyrights in any preexisting 
work. In reality, it could be the other way around where the 
preexisting work had copied the new one. An aggrieved artist 
may file a notification to resolve the dispute following the 
procedures set forth in Section V.C.126 Alternatively, she may 
directly file a lawsuit in court. In this case, she has to 
overcome by preponderance of the evidence the blockchain 
record that a court may accord the weight of prima facie 
evidence. 
B. Approval Mechanism 
If a user publishes a new work that incorporates an 
original work, BCE requires her to send an application to its 
original owner in the BCE community or otherwise obtain a 
license. Within ten days of receipt of the application, the 
original owner may request BCE to take down the published 
work. Upon receipt of the request, BCE would promptly 
remove the published work and forfeit all the revenues 
derived from the same. If the original owner does not respond 
to an application during the ten-day period, she still has the 
right to request a takedown afterwards. However, all the 
revenues incurred before the takedown would be allocated 
exclusively to the publisher. 
Alternatively, the original owner may approve 
publication of the new work unconditionally, or on the 
condition that she receives a percentage or entirety of royalty 
revenues derived from the new work. BCE would promptly 
forward the approval to the publisher. In the case of a 
 
 125. See infra Section V.B. 
 126. See infra Section V.C. 
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conditional approval, if the publisher chooses to reject it 
within ten days of receipt of the approval, BCE would remove 
the published work and forfeit all the revenues; if the 
publisher agrees with or does not respond to the conditional 
approval within ten days of receipt, BCE would proceed to 
distribute revenues in accordance with the proposed 
condition. 
The approval mechanism is particularly useful for user 
general content (“UGC”) such as a smartphone video taken 
during a concert or a cover version produced at home.127 
Many fans are passionate about publishing videos of their 
favorite artists and personal covers of their favorite songs. 
BCE expects that most artists approve of UGC as a form of 
interaction with fans, especially when it is properly credited 
and generates new income streams for artists. 
C. Dispute Resolution 
BCE designs a dispute resolution scheme on the basis of 
the notice and takedown procedures under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998.128 
If a user publishes a new work that incorporates another 
original work without obtaining a license or sending a proper 
application, the original owner may send a notice to request 
BCE to take down the new work. Upon receipt of the 
takedown notice, BCE would expeditiously remove the new 
work and promptly forward the notice to the publisher. If the 
publisher believes the notice is mistaken, she may send BCE 
a counternotice to dispute the former within ten days of 
receipt. BCE would promptly forward the counternotice to 
the original owner. BCE would revive the new work after ten 
days, unless BCE has received a further notice that the 
 
 127. See generally UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners LLC, 718 
F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2013); Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 
28 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 128. See generally Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 
Stat. 2860 (1998). 
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original owner has filed a legal action seeking a court order 
to enjoin the new work. 
Alternatively, the original owner may send a notice to 
request BCE to transfer a percentage or the entirety of 
royalty revenues derived from the new work. BCE would 
expeditiously seize the revenue streams and promptly 
forward the notice to the publisher. If the publisher agrees 
with or does not respond to the notice within ten days of 
receipt, BCE would start to distribute revenues in 
accordance with the notice. If the publisher believes the 
notice is mistaken or unreasonable, she may send BCE a 
counternotice to dispute the former within ten days of 
receipt. BCE would promptly forward the counternotice to 
the original owner. BCE would revive the revenue streams 
after 10 days, unless BCE has received a further notice that 
the original owner has filed a legal action seeking a court 
order to seize the royalty revenues. 
D. Automated Investigation 
As BCE produces digital fingerprints of creative works 
on the blockchain in a transparent and immutable way, 
copyright owners may take advantage of the digital 
fingerprints to optimize copyright enforcement on the 
internet. For example, BCE may develop a digital fingerprint 
search engine to detect infringing copies of original works on 
unlicensed websites. The search engine would be accessible 
exclusively to copyright owners and their trusted agents who 
use it for anti-piracy purposes only. Furthermore, BCE may 
implement a crowdsourcing system to invite “bounty 
hunters” to anonymously investigate and report online 
infringements in exchange for BCE tokens. Once copyright 
owners successfully recover damages from the infringers, the 
BCE blockchain would automatically distribute a percentage 
to the bounty hunters. The bounty system through a 
distributed network is particularly useful in places on the 
internet where search engine crawlers may not reach, such 
as the dark web and password-protected digital lockers. 
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E. Fundamental Solution 
Fundamentally, BCE may in effect prevent copyright 
piracy by providing overwhelming ethical and financial 
reasons for users to do the right thing. 
Copyright piracy arises from a combination of social 
norms and economic incentives that work against legitimate 
licenses. First, copyright piracy is often rooted in a confusion 
over the economics of copyright protection. 129  Many 
consumers regard a creative work purely as a public good 
that is non-rivalrous in consumption: where is the harm of 
an unlicensed stream or download, if it does not prevent the 
author from enjoying the work herself or distributing the 
same to others? This view is flawed in its narrow focus on 
inexhaustibility of consumption rather than scarcity of 
creativity. Second, there is a widespread perception that 
copyright protection primarily benefits multinational 
corporations that unduly exploit artists.130 This perception 
may lead to a glorification of copyright piracy as a kind of 
anti-establishment movement aiming to liberate artists. 
Third, certain consumers may turn to copyright piracy 
simply as an alternative to conventional online services.131 
They are unwilling to pay for offerings that charge high 
prices as a result of exorbitant transaction costs, lack variety 
in new content, and revolve around popstars at the expense 
of emerging artists and independent artists. 
The BCE ecosystem cultivates a sea change in social 
 
 129. For comprehensive surveys of economic theories of intellectual property, 
see, for example, ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 135–149 
(1988); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 37 (17th ed. 
2001); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326–44 (1989). 
 130. For a summary of diverse perceptions on copyright, see, for example, Peter 
K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331 (2003); Daniel C.K. Chow, 
Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
203 (2006). 
 131. See, e.g., CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE 135–61 
(2009). 
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dynamics surrounding copyright protection. First, the BCE 
community reinforces the direct bond between artists and 
users through mining, sponsorship, and other 
communications. Second, by channeling reasonable royalties 
directly to artists, BCE highlights the fact that flesh-and-
blood authors rather than corporate machines are the 
ultimate beneficiaries of copyright protection. Ethically, 
consumers may respect copyright more with the 
understanding that copyright royalties provide economic 
lifeblood for creative artists and piracy is by no means a 
victimless infringement. Third, BCE generates a number of 
financial incentives for users to consume licensed content: 
BCE coupons allow free access to creative works by average 
users with minimal transaction costs. After downloading 
legitimate copies of creative works, users may mine BCE 
tokens by marketing, distributing, and voting for these 
works. Users may earn additional BCE tokens through direct 
investment in new works. Changing social norms and 
financial calculus may influence legal behaviors much more 
effectively than legal punishments alone may achieve. 
VI. BCE TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
The BCE ecosystem is built principally on a technological 
infrastructure comprised of the following key elements: 
A. BCE Token 
The BCE community operates on an ERC20 utility token 
that enables all users to access creative works and 
participate in community activities. The ERC20 interface 
allows for the emission of a standard token that is backward 
compatible with the existing infrastructure of the Ethereum 
network, e.g., wallets, development tools, and token 
exchanges. 132  Additionally, BCE implements a token 
 
 132. See Fabian Vogelsteller & Vitalik Buterin, EIP 20: ERC-20 Token 
Standard, ETHEREUM IMPROVEMENT PROPOSALS (Nov. 2015), https://eips 
.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20. 
1080 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  69 
mechanism to incentivize contributions by users, ensuring 
equitable rewards not only for artists who publish creative 
works but also for those who market and promote the works. 
The emission of ERC20 tokens may in theory employ one 
of the three approaches introduced below. Of the three, the 
BCE approach is superior in measuring both subjective and 
objective values of creative works. 
1. Spotify Approach 
If we intend to closely imitate current market structures 
dominated by freemium services such as Spotify, we could 
consider issuing two different kinds of tokens, respectively 
for the free tier (e.g., Silver Token) and for the paid tier (e.g., 
Gold Token). BCE would reward artists Sliver Tokens for 
advertisement-supported free consumption by users, and 
Gold Tokens for advertisement-free paid consumptions by 
users. By the end of each reporting period, BCE would 
distribute advertisement revenues in accordance with the 
percentage each artist earns in the total Silver Token pool 
accumulated during the same period. Similarly, BCE would 
distribute royalty payments in accordance with the 
percentage each artist earns in the total Gold Token pool 
accumulated during the reporting period. 
There are a number of limitations inherent in this 
approach, which does not take full advantage of the 
blockchain technology. First, as discussed above, freemium 
and other advertisement-based services, by exchanging free 
access to creative works for user attention to advertisements, 
tend to undermine the market value of creative works. The 
experience so far suggests that the conversion rates from free 
users to paying users are fairly low.133 The conversion rate 
could be lower in the blockchain environment unfamiliar to 
mainstream users. Second, the nascent stage of a freemium 
 
 133. See, e.g., Jon Porter, Spotify Is First to 100 Million Paid Subscribers, THE 
VERGE (Apr. 29, 2019, 7:39 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/29/18522297 
/spotify-100-million-users-apple-music-podcasting-free-users-advertising-voice-
speakers (paying users are less than a half of all users). 
2021] BLOCKCHAIN COPYRIGHT EXCHANGE 1081 
service is often vulnerable when users, particularly paying 
subscribers, are limited in number and the service is forced 
to rely heavily on advertisements for revenues. However, 
there is a chicken-and-egg problem to the extent that 
advertisers are similarly reluctant to patronize a new service 
that has yet to establish a substantial user base.134 Third, 
the distribution of advertisement revenues on the basis of 
free access leaves room for malicious users to game the 
system, e.g., by employing robotic tools to play a single song 
day and night to misappropriate an unwarranted share of 
the revenue pool. 
We may theoretically remove the free tier and only retain 
the paying tier, which would require users to purchase all 
their tokens spent on content consumption. However, this 
paywall may erect an entry barrier, financially and mentally, 
for average consumers who are not so sophisticated in 
cryptocurrency transactions. Currently, it is rarely 
straightforward to purchase a cryptocurrency in a secondary 
market. Users usually need to first create a digital wallet 
with an exchange (e.g., Coinbase) that offers leading 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum in exchange 
for fiat currencies. Afterwards, users may need to find 
another exchange (e.g., Binance) that offers the desired 
cryptocurrency in exchange for Bitcoin or Ethereum. 
Apparently, the need to purchase cryptocurrency for any 
consumption, no matter how trivial it is in market value, 
may create substantial transaction costs that impede market 
expansion to mainstream consumers. 
2. Steem Approach 
The widely acclaimed blockchain platform Steem 
implements a scheme of token emission that improves upon 
the market approach: it removes the financial need for 
 
 134. See Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition 
Among Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J. ECON. 309, 310 (2003). 
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artists to rely on advertisement revenues. 135  Instead, it 
periodically distributes a predetermined quantity of tokens 
pro rata among users in accordance with the subjective 
values of their individual contributions, as measured 
principally by the weighted votes by all stakeholders.136 The 
voting system does not necessarily preclude the possibility of 
malicious manipulation, such as voting repetitively for 
oneself. In response, Steem imposes a cap on voting power so 
that individual users can only vote for a limited number of 
works per day.137 
The Steem approach has an important shortcoming: it 
invariably distributes a fixed quantity of tokens no matter 
how many people participate, how many works are published, 
and how often these works are consumed.138 In other words, 
the fixed quantity basically sets a ceiling for token emission. 
The more users participate and the more works are 
published, the less tokens each user and each work would 
receive.139 In economic terms, the Steem approach focuses on 
the relative weights that consumers attach to individual 
works on the platform but falls short of measuring the values 
of these works against other products in the general market. 
3. BCE Approach 
First, BCE allocates each subscriber a predetermined 
quantity of free BCE coupons on a weekly basis. The BCE 
coupons are inalienable and may only be converted to BCE 
tokens through stream, download, or other activities within 
the BCE community. We may set the value of free BCE 
coupons constantly at the equivalent of 600 streams per 
 
 135. See STEEM, STEEM: AN INCENTIVIZED, BLOCKCHAIN-BASED, PUBLIC 
CONTENT PLATFORM 31–32 (2017), https://steem.com/SteemWhitePaper.pdf. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See id. 
 139. It is unclear whether such a decrease in token quantity allocated could be 
offset by an increase in individual token value in the marketplace as the 
community grows in number of members and works. 
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month, given the standard length of a song is generally 
believed to be three minutes and assuming a user spends one 
hour per day enjoying the works in the BCE community.140 
Second, we need to determine the exchange rate between 
stream and download. Billboard currently equates one album 
to 1,500 streams and ten downloads for the purposes of 
charting, which appears to be consistent with current 
streaming rates at freemium services but, as mentioned 
above, significantly underrates the market values of creative 
works. 141  Therefore, we set the ratio of stream versus 
download of a song at 100-to-1. 
Third, if a subscriber streams or downloads a work, a 
portion of her BCE coupons will automatically be converted 
into BCE tokens and transferred to the relevant artists. This 
is one of the major channels in which new BCE tokens are 
emitted after the initial sales. BCE tokens are the utility 
tokens for the BCE community, enabling subscribers to 
stream, download any works, and participate in other 
activities in the BCE community. Because BCE tokens are 
alienable in nature, a subscriber may either earn BCE 
tokens by her contributions to the BCE community or simply 
purchase BCE tokens from third parties at the market rate. 
Fourth, when BCE coupons are converted into BCE 
tokens, the value of a download is artificially set at $1, the 
market rate established as early as the advent of the iTunes 
store in 2003.142 Accordingly, the value of a stream is set at 
$0.01. We may also set the price of a BCE token at a certain 
price during the initial sales but allow the price to fluctuate 
afterwards in the secondary market. As long as we hold the 
 
 140. See Rhett Allain, Why Are Songs on the Radio About the Same Length?, 
WIRED (July 11, 2014, 8:31 AM) https://www.wired.com/2014/07/why-are-songs-
on-the-radio-about-the-same-length/ (maintaining that songs tend to be around 
three minutes long). 
 141. See Billboard 200 Makeover: Album Chart to Incorporate Streams & Track 
Sales, BILLBOARD (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns 
/chart-beat/6320099/billboard-200-makeover-streams-digital-tracks. 
 142. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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value of a download constant at $1, the emission of new 
tokens will decrease over time as the market value of BCE 
tokens gradually increases in the long run, although the 
amount of enjoyment per subscriber permitted by BCE 
coupons stays constant. 143 
Fifth, for each stream or download, BCE automatically 
generates an additional 10% of the value for mining by 
hosting and 20% of the value for mining by linking. 
Sixth, BCE takes several measures to minimize the risks 
of sybil attacks and other automation: (i) A user may sign up 
for the BCE community through a social media account 
including Facebook, Twitter, or WeChat. If she does not 
provide her social media account, she may alternatively sign 
up with her phone number and email address. (ii) We may 
during the sign-up process implement the reCAPTCHA 
technology, which has proven to be effective and economic in 
preventing robotic spams.144 (iii) Although free BCE coupons 
may be more than enough for a causal member in the BCE, 
a high frequency user who quickly spent all her BCE coupons 
would be required to purchase BCE tokens to further enjoy 
the creative works and other activities. (iv) BCE regularly 
recoups unused BCE coupons and issues new BCE coupons 
on a monthly basis. And (v) a download triggers a transfer of 
BCE tokens once the download is complete. A download 
triggers the emission of new BCE tokens after a subscriber 
has played the work for at least thirty minutes cumulatively. 
A stream triggers a transfer or emission of BCE tokens on 
the condition that a subscriber has played at least three 
minutes of a work. 
 
 143. In other words, the amount of enjoyment allowed by free BCE coupons per 
subscriber per month stays constant at 600 streams although the amount of BCE 
tokens that the BCE coupons may be converted into fluctuates depending on 
market situations. 
 144. See What Is reCAPTCHA?, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/recaptcha 
/about/ (last visited June 27, 2021). 
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B. Distributed Ledgers 
The BCE ecosystem entails multiple blockchains to 
process complex copyright transactions of distinct natures. 
For example, when artists auction off copyright ownership in 
their works during crowdfunding campaigns or otherwise 
assign copyright ownership to third parties, these 
transactions are low-frequency and high-value in nature. By 
contrast, when artists license their works for public 
consumption and when users are mining BCE tokens by 
distributing, marketing, and voting for new works, these 
transactions are high-frequency and low-value in nature. 
Therefore, BCE introduces a bi-ledger structure to 
streamline smart contracts and increase transaction security. 
The following explains how the two layers of distributed 
ledgers function and interact. 
1. Ledger I – Low-Frequency and High-Value 
Ethereum, a public blockchain based on a proof-of-work 
(“PoW”) protocol, is one of the most popular blockchain 
environments for building decentralized applications.145 It 
pioneers the smart-contract functionality by providing a 
decentralized Turing-complete virtual machine, the 
Ethereum Virtual Machine (“EVM”), to execute scripts, i.e., 
smart contracts written in a Turing-complete scripting 
language and stored on the Ethereum blockchain. A PoW 
protocol like Ethereum features a high degree of security and 
integrity, as anyone who intends to engage in double 
spending has to at least accumulate more than 50% of the 
processing power of the whole network, which is sometimes 
called a “51% attack.”146 It is estimated that it takes about 
 
 145. See Prices, COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/price (last visited Aug. 4, 
2021) (showing Ethereum is the second largest cryptocurrency in value); see 
generally Vitalik Buterin, Ethereum Whitepaper: A Next-Generation Smart 
Contract and Decentralized Application Platform, ETHEREUM (June 27, 2021), 
https://ethereum.org/en/whitepaper/ (describing the history of proof-of-work 
protocol and how Ethereum works). 
 146. MIT MEDIA LAB, 51% Attacks, DIGIT. CURRENCY INITIATIVE, 
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525 times Google’s entire computing power to hack the 
Bitcoin blockchain, and Ethereum is about a third of Bitcoin 
in size.147 
PoW protocols currently have certain limitations in 
scalability. First, unlike credit card systems that may 
process over 1,500 transactions per second, Bitcoin may only 
handle three to four transactions per second, and Ethereum 
may relay around twenty to twenty-five transactions per 
second.148 Second, Ethereum implements a transaction fee 
called “gas” in order to prevent spamming the network.149 
However, the transaction fee, calculated on the basis of 
required computational resources rather than the values of 
transactions, happens to make micropayments financially 
unsustainable. The hurdles of high latency and transaction 
costs make Ethereum less attractive for high-frequency, low-
value transactions. 
BCE may instead deploy low-frequency, high-value 
transactions onto Ethereum, such as copyright ownership 
information and smart contracts for copyright assignment 
transactions. In other words, the copyright exchange that 
facilitates crowdfunding, auctions, and other sales is set up 
principally on Ethereum as its backend. 
2. Ledger II – High-Frequency and Low-Value 
The BCE ecosystem involves various high-frequency and 
low-value microtransactions, including end user licenses for 
consumption and mining activities by means of distributing, 
marketing, and voting for new works. BCE currently has two 
options to improve upon Ethereum by minimizing 
transaction fees and maximizing transaction speed. First, 
 
https://dci.mit.edu/51-attacks (last visited Aug. 4, 2021). 
 147. Josh Hall, How the Technology Behind Bitcoin Could Change the Music 
Industry – and Help Everyone Get Paid, FACT MAG. (Feb. 21, 2017), 
http://www.factmag.com/2017/02/21/blockchain-bitcoin-music-industry/. 
 148. In other words, it takes Bitcoin approximately ten minutes and takes 
Ethereum approximately fifteen seconds to process a block. 
 149. See Buterin, supra note 145. 
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BCE may employ such an off-chain scaling solution as the 
Raiden Network to facilitate seamless microtransactions 
through state channels.150  The Raiden Network elegantly 
allows secure token transfers without the need for a global 
consensus, by using digitally signed and hash-locked 
transfers, called balance proofs, fully collateralized by 
previously setup on-chain deposits. The Raiden Network has 
the technological potential to scale up the Ethereum 
blockchain to one million transactions per second.151 
Alternatively, BCE may deploy high-frequency and low-
value microtransactions onto a public blockchain like EOS, 
Steem, or BitShare, which are based on a delegated proof of 
stake protocol (“DPoS”). For example, the first EOS 
blockchain depending on EOSIO 1.0 went online in June 
2018.152 It has a remarkably low degree of latency, taking a 
half-second to generate a block, and currently processes up 
to a thousand transactions per second, forty times faster 
than Ethereum does. In accordance with the EOSIO 
Technical White Paper (v2), an EOS blockchain may 
ultimately scale to millions of transactions per second while 
totally removing transaction fees.153 
Meanwhile, a DPoS blockchain has its own 
limitations.154  Taking EOS as an example, all blockchain 
stakeholders, e.g., EOS token holders, elect twenty-one block 
 
 150. See generally What Is the Raiden Network?, RAIDEN NETWORK, 
https://raiden.network/101.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2021) (describing Raiden’s 
off-chain scaling solution). 
 151. See Alyssa Hertig, Will Ethereum Beat Bitcoin to Mainstream 
Microtransactions?, COINDESK (June 1, 2016, 9:04 AM), https://www.coindesk 
.com/ethereum-bitcoin-mainstream-microtransactions/. 
 152. EOSIO 1.0 Release, B1 (June 1, 2018), https://b1.com/press/eosio-1-0-
release/. 
 153. EOS.IO Technical White Paper v2, GITHUB (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://github.com/EOSIO/Documentation/blob/master/TechnicalWhitePaper 
.md. 
 154. See, e.g., Vitalik Buterin, Governance, Part 2: Plutocracy Is Still Bad, 
VITALIK BUTERIN’S WEBSITE (Mar. 28, 2018), https://vitalik.ca/general/2018 
/03/28/plutocracy.html. 
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producers through a continuous voting system. These block 
producers generate blocks in the rounds of 126 (six blocks 
each, times twenty-one producers) in an order agreed upon 
by fifteen or more producers. As a consequence, a DPoS 
blockchain may be prone to a concentration of power in the 
hands of a small number of majority stakeholders often 
called “whales,” especially when minority stakeholders are 
inclined to delegate their voting power to others. Whales, as 
well as block producers, may collude with one another to 
manipulate the blockchain and further their private benefits, 
e.g., by censoring transactions to be included in blocks. 
Although the EOS blockchain is still at a nascent stage, the 
experience on the Steem blockchain, which has been 
implementing a similar DPoS protocol since 2016, indicates 
that merely 6.73% of stakeholders vote for block producers 
(called “witnesses” in the context of Steem), with most of the 
voters being whales.155 
BCE employs a bi-ledger structure by deploying 
copyright ownership and assignment transactions on Ledger 
I (low-frequency and high-value) and deploying copyright 
licensing and mining transactions on Ledger II (high-
frequency and low-value). The two layers of distributed 
ledgers are synchronized on a daily basis through inter-
blockchain communications to increase network security. 
BCE distributed ledgers would be able to respond promptly 
to, and withstand, malicious attacks unless both layers were 
compromised simultaneously. 
3. Encryption 
At present, it is technologically difficult and unnecessary 
to record a whole audio or audiovisual file in a blockchain. 
We may instead derive a hash from a file and incorporate the 
hash into a blockchain. As mentioned above, a blockchain is 
useful to stamp the time of publication, establish priority to 
 
 155. Tanishqyeverma, Is This a Shortcoming of DPOS and Will Remain One?, 
STEEMIT, https://steemit.com/blockchain/@tanishqyeverma/is-this-a-shortcoming 
-of-dpos-and-will-remain-one (last visited June 27, 2021). 
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resolve potential disputes on copyright ownership, and 
facilitate copyright enforcement against piracy. Figure 17 
compares four potential approaches to generating the hash 
of an audiovisual file for a blockchain. 
FIGURE 17. Leading Encryption Technologies 
 Header Encryption Fingerprint Watermark 
Security Low Medium High Medium 
Robustness Low Medium High High 
Flexibility High High Medium High 
User-
Friendliness 
High Low High Medium 
a. DRM 
While it appears straightforward to generate a hash by 
inputting the entire file, such a method has inherent 
limitations in security156 and robustness157 as a file identifier. 
For example, a user can randomly delete a small fragment 
(say 0.1 second) at the beginning or the end of the file and 
generate a different hash without substantially affecting the 
audiovisual quality. In this way, one may easily evade the 
usage tracking in a blockchain. In the worst-case scenario, 
one may set up an infringing account, with a different hash 
for the essentially same file, to divert payment of royalties 
from the rightful owner. 
Sometimes, copyright owners insert ownership 
information and/or license conditions into the headers of 
audiovisual files. However, such header data is as vulnerable 
to alteration and removal as the files themselves. It is 
technically trivial for professional hackers to identify and 
remove header data. There is no guarantee that the header 
 
 156. Security describes whether a file identifier is susceptible to removal or 
change without substantially affecting the content quality. 
 157. Robustness refers to whether a file identifier may be lost or altered during 
the course of file transformation from one format to another. 
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data may even survive after one transforms the file from one 
format to another (“transcoding”). If one plays a song in a 
digital format over a speaker and records it in another digital 
file (the “analog hole”), all header data would certainly be 
lost.158 
For the purpose of enhancing security and robustness in 
an audiovisual file, a user may encrypt the entire file with 
one of the existing digital rights management (“DRM”) 
protocols. 159  DRM greatly minimizes the risk of undue 
alternation, as only authorized users who possess the 
decryption key may access the file. Nonetheless, DRM has so 
far proved to be unpopular in the marketplace, because it 
tends to be overly restrictive of secondary usages by 
consumers and too cumbersome for digital distribution. 
b. Digital Fingerprint 
A copyright owner may employ a digital fingerprint 
algorithm to generate a set of descriptors of the sound 
contained in an original audiovisual work. By comparing the 
digital fingerprints of the original and of other files, the 
system can automatically identify all the files that 
essentially sound the same to listeners as the original does. 
Because digital fingerprints are inherent in audiovisual files, 
it would be unlikely to disappear no matter how many times 
users have transformed them into different formats. Also, it 
is technologically difficult to separate them from the files 
without significantly altering the quality. If well developed, 
 
 158. See generally Douglas C. Sicker et al., The Analog Hole and the Price of 
Music: An Empirical Study, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 573, 576 (2007) 
(defining the analog whole and describing how it arises). 
 159. See, e.g., Carlisle George & Navin Chandak, Issues and Challenges in 
Securing Interoperability of DRM Systems in the Digital Music Market, 20 INT’L 
REV. L. COMPUTS. & TECH. 271, 272–275 (2006). The article introduces the 
following DRMs implemented by iTunes: (1) Users can make a maximum of seven 
CD copies of any particular playlist of songs purchased from the iTunes Store; (2) 
Users can access their purchased songs on a maximum of five computers; and (3) 
Songs can only be played on a computer with iTunes or an iPod, and other MP3 
devices do not support FairPlay encoded tracks. 
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a fingerprint-based hash results in a meaningful 
improvement in robustness and security over a simple hash 
of the whole file, to the extent that deleting small fragments 
of a file typically would not affect its digital fingerprints. The 
market abounds in sophisticated digital fingerprint solutions, 
including Audible Magic, Gracenote, and TuneSat.160 
c. Digital Watermark 
A digital watermark is a unique marker (e.g., a serial of 
numbers) inserted into an audiovisual file as its identifier to 
connect the file with its ownership information and/or 
licensing terms (“payload”). Copyright owners may employ 
watermarking tools to embed a payload identifier into a file, 
detect the watermark, and/or extract the payload identifier 
from the watermark. However, a well-developed watermark 
does not affect the audiovisual quality, because it is 
imperceptible to general audiences. Additionally, certain 
digital watermarks are so robust as to survive transcoding, 
excepting, and analog holes. Unlike digital fingerprinting, 
digital watermarking allows copyright owners the flexibility 
of assigning different identifiers to different copies that 
contains essentially the same content. For examples, music 
labels sometimes allocate multiple identifiers for the same 
song to be distributed in multiple channels. 
A digital watermark has its own drawbacks compared 
with a digital fingerprint. First, copyright owners need to 
insert digital watermarks into audiovisual files before their 
distribution in order to effectively track their usage. In 
contrast, digital fingerprints may work equally well no 
matter whether the copies have been distributed or not. 
Second, there are documented incidents where hackers 
successfully detected and removed digital watermarks 
embedded in audiovisual files.161 
 
 160. See generally U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 33, at 62 (describing digital 
acoustic fingerprinting). 
 161. See, e.g., Princeton Scientists Sue Over Squelched Research, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/press/releases/princeton-scientists-sue-
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C. Distributed Storage 
BCE does not store any audiovisual files in centralized 
servers, which would not only be prohibitively expensive but 
also vulnerable to malicious attacks. Instead, BCE 
establishes a storage layer based on the InterPlanetary File 
System (“IPFS”), which is a peer-to-peer distributed file 
system that may connect a large number of scattered 
computing devices in a global network.162 A file in the IPFS 
system is divided into small fragments and stored on a 
cluster of remote nodes to achieve faster transmission 
speed.163 Unlike the de facto HTTP protocol, IPFS addresses 
all files by the hashes of their content as opposed to URL 
addresses.164 Additionally, nodes need not trust one another, 
and there is no single point of attack. 
BCE may implement an asymmetric encryption system 
to control access to IPFS-hosted files, consisting of the 
following steps: First, the IPFS system automatically 
encrypts all audiovisual files published in the BCE 
community by BCE’s public key. Second, when a user 
streams or downloads a file, the system retrieves its IPFS 
address, loads the file from the IPFS swarm, and decrypts it 
by BCE’s private key. Third, the system re-encrypts the file 
by the user’s public key and then distributes it to the user. 
In this way, the IPFS system ensures that, even if a hacker 
managed to comprised some of the BCE nodes, what she 
could obtain would not be more than encrypted fragmental 
files of negligible commercial value. 
As mentioned above, users who operate hosting nodes in 
the BCE community are qualified to mine BCE tokens in 
proportion to the extra storage space and bandwidth devoted. 
 
over-squelched-research (last visited Aug. 4, 2021). 
 162. See IPFS Powers the Distributed Web, supra note 117. 
 163. How IPFS Works, IPFS, https://ipfs.io/#how (last visited Aug. 4, 2021). 
 164. See id. 
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D. Decentralized Application (daap) 
The BCE daap is comprised principally of a media 
player, an IPFS node, and a graphic user interface. It may be 
deployed through the App Store and Google Play. 
The BCE website, which serves as an online gateway for 
the BCE community, may incorporate the same components, 
which are regularly synchronized with the BCE daap. 
E. Copyright Exchange 
BCE builds a copyright exchange around two categories 
of complex smart contracts that automate market 
transactions regarding copyright assignment, copyright 
licensing, and BCE mining. 
1. Assignment Market 
Artists may launch their crowdfunding campaigns in the 
copyright exchange, offering a portion of copyright ownership 
and royalty revenues in their creative works in exchange for 
upfront investments by sponsors. Once artists set the 
crowdfunding targets—e.g., the percentage of copyright 
ownership offered, the maximum number of sponsors, and 
the minimum amount of investment raised—BCE smart 
contracts would automatically enforce the crowdfunding 
process by setting up escrow accounts, distributing funds, 
and arranging approval and delivery of creative works. 
Alternatively, the copyright exchange allows artists to 
directly auction or sell their shares in creative works to third 
parties. 
2. License Market 
Once a user streams or downloads a licensed work, BCE 
smart contracts generate or transfer the predetermined 
amount of BCE tokens to relevant artists. Furthermore, BCE 
smart contracts simultaneously award BCE tokens in 
proportion to the contributions by users who distribute, 
market, and vote for creative works. As mentioned above, the 
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assignment market is built on Ethereum while the license 
market is built on Raiden or EOS. 
CONCLUSION 
Healthy copyright markets depend on a delicate balance 
between strong incentive for intellectual creation and broad 
access to intellectual products. 165  Existing online services 
like Spotify and YouTube significantly broaden access by 
offering free and low-price content to the general public. 
However, they are falling short on the incentive side of the 
equation by denying artists their equitable rewards. The 
BCE ecosystem redresses the balance between incentive and 
access. BCE hardcodes a complex web of thousands of 
copyright rules and license terms through blockchain-based 
smart contracts. By doing so, BCE eliminates substantial 
transaction costs in copyright industries, which traditionally 
deprive artists of the majority of their royalty revenues. BCE 
establishes a sustainable ecosystem that maintains free 
access to creative works for average users while dramatically 
increasing incentives to all contributors to the BCE 
community: Artists who publish creative works may earn a 
royalty per stream potentially sixteen times larger than 
Spotify offers and eighty times larger than YouTube offers, 
at a speed millions of times faster. Sponsors who finance 
creative productions through copyright crowdfunding or 
upfront sales may directly receive a percentage of royalty 
revenues. Miners who distribute, promote, and vote for 
creative works may mine BCE tokens in accordance with 
their respective contributions. The BCE ecosystem embodies 
the vision that the best way to combat piracy is to develop a 
product serving consumers better than piracy. 
 
 165. For detailed surveys of economic theories on copyright, see PAUL 
GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 1 (3d ed. 2016); WILLIAM M. LANDES & 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
37–84 (2003). See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, The Economics of Copyright: An 
Historical Perspective, 38 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1988). 
